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ARTICLE
IMPOUNDMENT PROCEDURES UNDER THE
COPYRIGHT ACT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
INFIRMITIES*
Paul S. Owens**
INTRODUCTION

An effective system of copyright protection depends on the
power copyright owners can exercise to control the use of their copyrighted works. The bundle of exclusive rights granted to authors by
the Copyright Act of 19761 would be rendered economically worthless if the copyright owners' remedies were insufficient to prevent
others from infringing those rights by unauthorized use.
Infringements and piracies have long plagued copyright owners
in this country. In recent years, however, the proliferation of new
technologies which facilitate the unauthorized copying and use of
protected works (particularly in the areas of satellite-delivered programming, computer software, and video), and the growing volume
of international trade in pirated copyrighted works, have posed serious threats to the rights of copyright owners. Every kind of copyrightable work is fair game for copyright piracy,3 both domestic and
foreign.4 The piracy "epidemic" has become so widespread that Con* Copyright 1985, by Paul S. Owens. All rights reserved.
** Copyright and entertainment law practitioner, Copiague, New York; B.A., 1974,

Williams College; J.D., 1981, Hofstra University School of Law.
1. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (1982 & Supp. II 1985).

2. For the purposes of this Article, a "pirate" is a criminal infringer, as defined by 17
U.S.C. § 506(a) - one who intentionally copies another's copyrighted work for commercial
advantage or private gain. 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1982). Such a copy is usually an identical copy
of all or substantially all of the plaintiff's work. Proof of intent, commercial advantage, or
private gain is not required for a finding of civil copyright infringement. The defendant need
only copy a validly copyrighted work. 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1982).
3. Sounds Illegal, ECONOMIST, Apr. 14, 1984, at 86 ("[C]ounterfeiting costs America
$8 billion in lost sales each year. . . .Taiwan, South Korea and Hong Kong are said to be the
three biggest sources of pirated goods in America.").

4. See Asser, Piracy Before Stockholm, PUB. WKLY., Apr. 18, 1980, at 36 (many
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gress has reacted by enacting or ratifying a number of provisions
bearing on infringements of copyrighted works.6
Notwithstanding proposed or existing legislation, pirated works

will continue to be introduced into commerce in the United States. 6

The protection of the American market from such works depends
largely upon the efforts of the United States Customs Service in
stopping such works entering from other countries at the borderJ
and the efforts of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in pursuing

domestic criminal infringers.8 The priorities and limited resources of
both these agencies, however, make it imperative that copyright

owners have a civil remedy at their disposal which effectively protects their copyright interests.
The need for such a remedy was recognized by Congress in the

Copyright Act of 1976. In addition to the remedies available after a
decision on the merits,9 the Copyright Act of 1976 (the 1976 Act)

signatories to the Berne Convention, the Universal Copyright Convention, or both, do little or
nothing to discourage piracy). Pirating copyrighted works has become a very profitable and
deeply entrenched way of doing business in such Far Eastern countries as Taiwan, South Korea, the Philippines, Singapore, and Hong Kong. See Burns, Taiwan Curbs Its Counterfeiters,
N.Y. Times, Mar. 30, 1986, § 3, at 4, col. 3. See also Russ Berrie & Co. v. Jerry Eisner Co.,
482 F. Supp. 980 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (plaintiff alleged its copyrighted stuffed toys were taken to
Far East, reproduced without permission, then sold to defendant who imported them into
United States); Attenborough, Stop Thief!, PUB. WKLY., June 24, 1983, at 60 (college-level
textbooks freely pirated in Far East).
5. See, e.g., Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-914
(Supp. II 1984) (amending Copyright Act of 1976 to give greater protection to copyright
owners of computer programs); Piracy and Counterfeiting Amendments Act of 1982, 18
U.S.C. § 2311 (1982) (providing criminal sanctions for affixing counterfeit labels to phonorecords or motion pictures). See also Brussels Satellite Convention, done May 21, 1974,
reprinted in TREATY Doc. No. 31, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1984) (available from U.S. Gov't
Printing Office) (to be printed in T.I.A.S.) (entered into force Aug. 25, 1979; for the United
States Mar. 7, 1985. TREATY AFFAIRS STAFF, OFFICE OF THE LEGAL ADVISOR, US. DEP'T OF
STATE, PUB. No. 9433, TREATIES IN FORCE 296 (1986)) (obligating signatories to prevent unauthorized interception of satellite-delivered programming, using full battery of remedies
available under Copyright Act of 1976).
6. Some of these works may gain re-entry by use of "laundered" documents. At-

tenborough, supra note 4, at 60.
7. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 602-603 (1982) and 19 C.F.R. §§ 133.41-133.46 (1985) for statutory authority and Customs Service regulations governing the seizure and detention or exclusion of "piratical copies" and other "prohibited importation" of copyrighted works. Section
337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1337, authorizes the International Trade Commis-

sion to instruct the Customs Service to exclude works that may unfairly cause injury to an
industry in the United States, including copyright infringing works.
8.

See 17 U.S.C.

§§

506-509 (1982). It is not unusual for corporate copyright owners

and industry associations to maintain antipiracy departments that often lay the initial investigatory groundwork for federal prosecutions.
9.

See 17 U.S.C.

§§

502, 503(b), 504-505 (1982).
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arms a plaintiff in an infringement action with two powerful pretrial
remedies: the preliminary injunction, 10 and the impoundment of the
alleged infringing articles by the United States marshal pending decision on the merits."
Impoundment under the 1976 Act, which may be ordered ex
parte and prior to judgment, raises constitutional questions. Such
seizures of property often violate the due process clause of the fifth
amendment by failing to provide notice and an opportunity to be
heard. They may also involve the seizure of works that communicate
ideas, and thus may be suppression or restraint of "speech" in violation of the first amendment. Furthermore, the impoundment provisions of the 1976 Act may violate the fourth amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures.
This Article will analyze the constitutional grounds upon which
the remedy of impoundment may be invalidated, and will propose
ways to rehabilitate impoundment as a means by which copyright
owners may control the use of their copyrighted works. This Article
will first examine the law presently governing impoundment, then
discuss the constitutional issues and, finally, propose procedures that
would cure the constitutional infirmities.
I.

THE REMEDY OF IMPOUNDMENT

Section 503 of the Copyright Act of 1976 empowers courts to
order the impoundment and destruction of articles infringing another's copyrighted work. 12 To get a true picture of impoundment
under the 1976 Act, section 503 must be read in conjunction with its
predecessors, sections 101(c) and (d) of the Copyright Act of 1909
(the 1909 Act), 13 and with the Supreme Court Rules4 for Practice
and Procedure Under the Copyright Act (the Rules).'
Although the Supreme Court Rules were specifically promulgated to effectuate impoundment under section 101(c) of the 1909
Act, these two provisions contain many inherent contradictions. The
uncertain case law that grew out of these provisions is examined below, particularly with regard to its development under the 1976 Act.
10.
11.

17 U.S.C. § 502(a) (1982).
17 U.S.C. § 503(a) (1982).

12.

17 U.S.C. § 503(a)-(b) (1982).

13. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075, reprintedin 17 U.S.C.A. at 224 (West
Supp. 1985) (repealed 1978).
14. 214 U.S. 533 (1909), amended by 307 U.S. 652 (1939) and 383 U.S. 1031 (1966).
Reprinted as amended [and hereinafter cited as], 17 U.S.C.A. foil. § 501 (West 1977).
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Section 101(c) of the 1909 Act stated:
If any person shall infringe the copyright in any work protected
under the copyright laws of the United States, such person shall be
liable . . .[t]o deliver up on oath, to be impounded during the

pendency of the action, upon such terms and conditions as the
court may prescribe, all articles alleged to infringe a copyright. 15
Shortly after this provision went into effect, the Supreme Court, pursuant to a limited rule-making power conferred by the 1909 Act, 16
promulgated rules to govern procedure in copyright actions. Rules 3
17
through 13 govern impoundment.
To obtain a writ of seizure under the Rules, a plaintiff need do
only two things. First, the Rules require:
Upon the institution of any action, suit or proceeding, or at any
time thereafter

. . .

the plaintiff or complainant, or his authorized

agent or attorney, may file with the clerk of any court given jurisdiction . .. an affidavit stating upon the best of his knowledge,

information and belief, the number and location, as near as may
be, of the alleged infringing copies, records, plates, molds, matrices,
etc., or other means for making the copies alleged to infringe the
copyright, and the value of the same ....11
Second, the Rules require that the plaintiff "shall file with the
clerk a bond executed by at least two sureties and approved by the
court or a commissioner thereof."' 9 The bond requirement is
designed to ensure "prompt prosecution of the action," and to provide, at the court's discretion, payment of damages to the defendant
if the impounded articles are found not be to be infringements. 20
Once the affidavit has been filed and the bond approved, the
Rules state:
[T] he clerk shall issue a writ directed to the marshal of the district
where the said infringing copies, plates, records, molds, matrices,
etc., or other means of making such infringing copies shall be
15. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075, 1061, reprinted in 17 U.S.C.A. at
234-35 (West Supp. 1985) (repealed 1978).
16. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075, 1082, reprinted in 17 U.S.C.A. at 224
(West Supp. 1985) (repealed 1978).
17. 17 U.S.C.A. foil. § 501, Rules 3-13 (West 1977).
18. 17 U.S.C.A. foil. § 501, Rule 3 (West 1977).
19. Id. The "commissioner" referred to in the text means United States commissioners,
which were replaced by United States "magistrates" pursuant to Pub. L. 90-578, Oct. 17,
1968, 82 Stat. 1107, 1118.
20. 17 U.S.C.A. foil. § 501, Rule 4 (West 1977).
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stated in said affadavit to be located . . . directing the said marshal to forthwith seize and hold the same subject to the order of
the court issuing said writ .... 21

The marshal is empowered to seize the articles, "using such force as
may be reasonably necessary in the premises, and serve on the defendant a copy of the affidavit, writ, and bond." 22 At no time under
the Supreme Court Rules or either copyright act is the plaintiff required to give notice to defendant of the application for a writ of

seizure.
Impoundment under the 1976 Act is governed by section
503(a), which provides:
At any time while an action under this title is pending, the
court may order the impounding, on such terms as it may deem
reasonable, of all copies or phonorecords claimed to have been
made or used in violation of the copyright owner's exclusive rights,
and of all plates, molds, matrices, masters, tapes, film negatives, or
other articles by means of which such copies or phonorecords may
be reproduced.2 3
A.

The Manner of Impoundment

Section 101(c) of the 1909 Act refers to a defendant delivering

up to a court on oath the alleged infringing articles.24 The Supreme
Court Rules, however, contemplate seizure by a marshal at any
premises where the plaintiff's affidavit alleges the infringing works
are located.26 Despite the discrepancy, early court decisions under
section 101(c) and the Rules allowed seizures of infringing articles,
wherever found by the marshal, as provided for in the Rules.2 6 Such

seizures continued under the 1909 Act up to the effective date of the
21. Id. (emphasis added).
22. 17 U.S.C.A. foll. § 501, Rule 5 (West 1977).
23. 17 U.S.C. § 503(a) (1982) (emphasis added). The 1976 Act makes no reference to
the Supreme Court Rules. The House Report on § 503(a) states that the Rules were promulgated "even though there is no specific provision authorizing them in the copyright statute...
[and] there appears no need for including a special provision [on the Rules] in the bill." H.R.
REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 160 (1976), reprinted in 1976 US. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 5776.

24. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075, 1081, reprinted in 17 U.S.C.A. at
234-35 (West Supp. 1985) (repealed 1978).
25. 17 U.S.C.A. foil. § 501, Rule 3 (West 1977).
26. See Universal Film Mfg. Co. v. Copperman, 206 F. 69 (S.D.N.Y. 1913), affd, 218
F. 577 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 235 U.S. 704 (1914); Crown Feature Film Co. v. Bettis Amusement Co., 206 F. 362 (N.D. Ohio 1913).
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1976 Act. 7 It is clear from the legislative history and the House
Report on section 503(a) that a "seizure" of the infringing works,
pursuant to a court's "order of impoundment," is intended by the
1976 Act.2
B.

The Scope of Impoundment

Section 101(c) authorized impoundment, during the pendency
of an action, of "all articles alleged to infringe," 2 a phrase which
apparently limited impoundment to infringing copies only. In contrast, the destruction provision of section 101(d) authorized destruction after judgment not only of "all the infringing copies or devices,"
but also of "all plates, molds, matrices, or other means for making
such infringing copies."30 The Rules empower the clerk to issue a
writ directing seizure of "the said infringing copies" and of "plates,
records, molds, matrices, etc., or other means of making the copies
alleged to infringe the copyright" at any time after "the institution
of any action, suit, or proceeding."3 " Thus, the Rules permit seizure
of instrumentalities used to make the alleged infringing copies, along
with the copies themselves, as soon as the plaintiff has filed a complaint and before any finding of infringement has been made.
By obscuring the distinction in section 101 between impoundment and destruction, the Rules greatly broadened the scope of articles that may be seized prior to judgment. Courts are split between
observing the narrow scope of seizure allowed by section 101(c)32
and the broader seizures allowed under the Rules. 3 The weight of
27. See, e.g., Warner Bros., Inc. v. Kalish, 201 U.S.P.Q. 768 (W.D.N.Y. 1978); Dealer
Advertising Dev., Inc. v. Barbara Allan Fin. Advertising, Inc., 197 U.S.P.Q. 611 (W.D. Mich.

1977) (hearing on plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction and defendant's motion to dissolve writ of seizure).
28. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 160 (1976), reprinted in 1976 US.
CONG. & AD. NEws 5776.

CODE

29. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075, 1081, reprinted in 17 U.S.C.A. at
234-35 (West Supp. 1985) (repealed 1978).

30. Id.
31. 17 U.S.C.A. foil. § 501, Rule 3 (West 1977).
32. See Universal Pictures Co. v. Schaeffer, 140 U.S.P.Q. 17 (E.D. Pa. 1963) (court
ordered seizure only of infringing motion picture film prints; apparently no seizure was made
of negatives or other means of producing infringing copies); Universal Film Mfg. Co. v. Copperman, 206 F. 69 (S.D.N.Y. 1913), afd, 218 F. 577 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 235 U.S. 704
(1914) (only positive print of motion picture seized, although defendant may not have pos-

sessed the negative); Jewelers' Circular Publishing Co. v. Keystone Publishing Co., 274 F. 932
(S.D.N.Y.

1921), alfd, 281 F. 83 (2d Cir. 1922), cert. denied, 259 U.S. 581 (1923) (only

infringing copies of directory seized).
33.

See Duchess Music Corp. v. Stern, 458 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
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authority of the later cases decided under the 1909 Act, however,
has inclined towards the wider reach of the Rules.
The broadest and most controversial seizure permitted was in
Duchess Music Corp. v. Stern,34 a 1972 Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision. A temporary restraining order and a writ of seizure
were issued ex parte, by a district court, against alleged "music pirates. ' 35 The writ authorized seizure of all infringing copies, instruments serving to mechanically reproduce the plaintiff's copyrighted
works, "and all means for making the same, comprehending labels,
cartridges, tape recordings and machinery utilized in the manufacturing process."'36 After execution of the writ, the district court upheld the seizure of all property that embodied "a mechanical and/or
electronic impression" of the plaintiff's copyrighted works "or any
packaging or promotional devices identifying or referring to the
same." 37 The court ordered the return, however, of items used to
make the infringing copies that did not embody, or were not identified to, the plaintiff's copyrighted works, including tape recording
equipment and machinery, blank tapes, cartridges, cassettes and labels, and unmarked or unprinted packaging materials.3 8
The Ninth Circuit reversed the lower court's decision and held
that "[m]achines, blank cassettes and cartridges, blank and printed
labels, and other devices are 'other means' for making [such] infringing copies" that may properly be impounded under section 101
(c) and the Supreme Court Rules.3 In reaching this decision, the
Court of Appeals relied heavily upon the legislative hearings held
with regard to the impoundment and destruction provisions of the
1909 Act. The court noted:
Congressmen, supporters, and opponents of the copyright bill
agreed that the impoundment and destruction provisions were
sweeping in their scope, and encompassed machines and items
which could be used for other, allegedly innocent purposes. ...
Congress intended to impound and destroy "the whole of the paraphernalia," including those items which may be used for other
847 (1972) (tape recording equipment as well as blank tapes, cartridges, cassettes, labels, and
packaging materials seized).
34. Id.

35. Id. at 1307.
36.
37.
38.

Id.
Id.
Id.

39. Id. at 1308.
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purposes.4 0

Under the Rules and the 1909 Act other courts have also permitted
impoundment of machinery capable of noninfringing uses,41 as well
as seizure of materials not embodying "impressions" of, or otherwise
42
identified to, the plaintiff's copyrighted work.
Unlike section 101(c) of the 1909 Act, section 503(a) of the
1976 Act explicitly authorizes impoundment of infringing copies and
"of all plates, molds, matrices, masters, tapes, film negatives, or
other articles by means of which such copies or phonorecords may
be reproduced."43 The 1976 Act appears to have ratified the greatly
broadened scope of impoundment permitted by the Rules 44 and to
have granted to courts wide discretion in tailoring orders of impoundment under section 503(a).
The phrase "or other articles" may be limited by the enumeration of instrumentalities immediately preceding it to only those articles embodying an identifiable impression of the copyrighted work.
No court under the 1976 Act, however, has authoritatively decided
whether neutral machinery capable of noninfringing uses and other
materials not embodying "impressions" of the plaintiff's copyrighted
work may properly be seized as "other articles by means of which
40. Id. at 1309.
41. See, e.g., Elektra Records Co. v. Gem Elec. Distrib., Inc., 360 F. Supp. 821
(E.D.N.Y. 1973) (seizure of 10 of defendant's Make-a-Tape machines ordered ex parte);
Warner Bros., Inc. v. Kalish, 201 U.S.P.Q. 768 (W.D.N.Y. 1978) (negative and positive motion picture prints and "machinery" seized from defendant's film lab).
Once infringement had been found, § 101(d) of the 1909 Act authorized destruction of
"all infringing copies or devices," and also of "all plates, molds, matrices, or other means for
making such infringing copies." 17 U.S.C. § 101(d) (1976) (repealed 1978). The scope of the
destruction order may be very broad and occasionally one will extend to items that are not
instrumentalities or other means for producing infringing copies. See Mode Art Jewelers Co. v.
Expansion Jewelry, Ltd., 199 U.S.P.Q. 329, 340-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (court ordered destruction of "all molds for making such copies and raw castings [of jewelry] and all related advertising and promotional materials, including all copies of the brochure for [promotion of jewelry]"). But see Dollcraft Indus., Ltd. v. Well-Made Toy Mfg. Co., 479 F. Supp. 1105, 1118
(E.D.N.Y. 1978) (court ordered U.S. marshall to hold all molds and patterns used to produce
infringing dolls; order did not include raw materials not yet utilized).
42. See Dealer Advertising Dev., Inc. v. Barbara Allan Fin. Advertising, Inc., 197
U.S.P.Q. 611, 619 (W.D. Mich. 1977) (seizure of defendant's allegedly infringing radio advertising campaign included impoundment of brochures, master tapes, scripts of presumably unproduced radio spots, sales form letters, and sales rate sheets).
43. 17 U.S.C. § 503(a) (1982) (emphasis added).
44. 17 U.S.C.A. foil. § 501, Rule 3 (West 1977). The scope of impoundment under the
Rules extends to the infringing articles and to "other means for making the copies alleged to
infringe the copyright." Id.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol14/iss1/10

8

Owens: Impoundment Procedures Under the Copyright Act: The Constitutiona
IMPOUNDMENT PROCEDURES

19851

'
[infringing] copies . . . may be reproduced."45

C. Persons Subject to Impoundment Orders

The prefatory language of section 101 states that "if any person
shall infringe

. . .

such person shall be liable" for the impoundment

and destruction of infringing copies.46 It was uncertain whether such
language limited impoundment and destruction only to items in the
possession and control of active infringers, or whether infringing
items possessed and controlled by innocent third parties could also be
impounded. Under the 1909 Act, courts generally limited impoundment to infringing articles within the defendant's possession and control.4" In one influential case decided in 1921, Jewelers' Circular
Publishing Co. v. Keystone PublishingCo.,48 the court held that the
plaintiff could not seize the defendant's infringing trade directories
from innocent bailees of the defendant. Rather, the plaintiff was re-

quired to work out its right to impoundment and destruction through
17 U.S.C. § 503(a)(1982). In Wallace Berrie & Co. v. Custom Styled Toys, Inc.,
25,492 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 1982), the court ordered impoundment of "all copies alleged to infringe the plaintiffs' copyrights and all means for making the
same." Similarly, in Martin Luther King, Jr. Center for Social Change, Inc. v. American
Heritage Prods., Inc., 508 F. Supp. 854, 861 (N.D. Ga. 1981), modified and rev'd on other
grounds, 694 F.2d 674 (11 th Cir. 1983), the court ordered impoundment of "all copies of the
infringing Pamphlets and Booklets in defendants' possession or control, as well as any plates or
other means for printing the infringing materials that may also be in defendants' possession."
Neither court indicated what those "other means" might be, nor did they report what articles
were seized pursuant to that phrase in the writ of seizure. But see RCA Records v. All-Fast
Systems, Inc., COPYRIGHT L. DECS. (CCH) 25,704 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 1984) (court refused
to order impoundment of a "Rezound" cassette-copying machine used to infringe plaintiffs'
copyrighted works because it was capable of noninfringing uses).
46. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075, reprintedin 17 U.S.C.A. at 234 (West
Supp. 1985) (repealed 1978).
47. See, e.g., Andre Matenciot, Inc. v. David & Dash, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 1199
(S.D.N.Y. 1976). The defendant allegedly infringed the plaintiff's design copyrights on two
fabric and wallpaper designs. Id. at 1201. The court ordered impoundment of all the infringing
copies of the plaintiff's works, and all catalogs displaying such copies, within the defendant's
"possession and control." Id. at 1203. In one of the few reported opinions discussing the scope
of such an impoundment order, the court held the defendant in contempt for failing to comply
with the order. Id. at 1201. Prior to the lawsuit, the defendant had sold the infringing catalogs
and materials to a number of independently owned distributors and showrooms, which in turn
sold them to the public. Id. at 1202-03. The court found that the defendant had failed to
speedily request that the distributors and the distributors' customers return the infringing designs and catalogs to the defendant, even though the defendant had no right to possession or
recall of those articles. Id. at 1206-07. Thus, the court held the defendant in contempt for
failing to take "all possible steps" to regain possession and control of the infringing articles. Id.
at 1207.
48. 274 F. 932, 936-37 (S.D.N.Y. 1921), affid, 281 F. 83 (2d Cir. 1922), cert. denied,
259 U.S. 581 (1922).
45.

COPYRIGHT L. DECS. (CCH)
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the defendant's right to recall the books from its customers and
49
distributors.
Under section 503(a) of the 1976 Act, however, courts have
been given the authority to order the impoundment of infringing articles "made or used in violation of the copyright owner's exclusive
rights." 50 The House Report indicates that the alternative phrase
("made or used") is meant to enable a court to exercise its discretion
with regard to articles which are lawfully reproduced or acquired
but which are used for infringing purposes.5 1
Despite the greatly increased discretion under the 1976 Act,
courts have generally followed the case law under the 1909 Act and
have only ordered impoundment of infringing articles actually under
defendant's possession and control. 2
49. Id. In an opinion by Judge Learned Hand, the district court stated:
[T]he possession of innocent bailees should be respected, because it is legal, and
should be disturbed only under the terms of the agreement that created it. They are
free to enjoy the piratical copies subject to the reserved rights of the defendant. If
so, the plaintiff must work out its right to forfeit through the defendant's right to
recall the books, and will be enjoined from its proposed course of seizing these books
in the hands of the defendant's customers. There is an especial ground in equity for
this, because, while such violence would be extremely disastrous to the defendant's
business, it could not possibly benefit the plaintiff if the defendant recalls the books
within a short time.
Id. But cf.National Research Bureau, Inc. v. Kucker, 481 F. Supp. 612, 615 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)
(court refused to order defendant to recall copies of infringing work already distributed).
50. 17 U.S.C. § 503(a) (1982).
51. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 160 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD.NEws 5776.
52. Martin Luther King, Jr. Center for Social Change, Inc. v. American Heritage
Prods., Inc., 508 F. Supp. 854 (N.D. Ga. 1981), modified and rev'd on other grounds, 694
F.2d 674 (11 th Cir. 1983); Cassidy v. Bowlin, COPYRIGHT L. DEcs. (CCH) 25,437 (W.D.
Mo. Apr. 9, 1982). In National Research Bureau, Inc. v. Kucker, 481 F. Supp. 612, 615
(S.D.N.Y. 1979), the court declined as "impractical" the plaintiff's request that the defendants be required to recall all the copies of their infringing shopping mall directories already
distributed. Instead, the defendants were directed to account only for profits from the directory
attributable to the copied matter.
Destruction of infringing articles under the 1909 Act similarly extended to only those
articles in the defendant's possession and control. See, e.g., Fisher-Price Toys v. My-Toy Co.,
385 F. Supp. 218, 223 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). In Mode Art Jewelers Co. v. Expansion Jewelry,
Ltd., 199 U.S.P.Q. 329, 340-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), the court permanently enjoined the defendants and its "officers, agents, servants and employees and those in privity with them" from
further infringing the plaintiff's copyrighted jewelry. Id. Although the injunction extended to
those in privity with the defendants, the order of destruction extended only to articles in the
defendants' possession. Id.
When the defendant's distribution and sales network is considerable, courts have tailored
orders of destruction to reach infringing articles out of the defendant's possession and control.
In Foreign & Domestic Music Corp. v. Michael M. Wyngate, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 82, 87
(S.D.N.Y. 1946), defendants' movie soundtrack infringed five of plaintiffs copyrighted songs.
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D. The Court's Discretion to Order Impoundment
Section 101(c) authorizes impoundment of alleged infringing
articles "upon such terms and conditions as the court may prescribe." 53 There is some ambiguity in the language of this provision.
Does the court's discretion extend to the threshold question of
whether or not to order impoundment at all, or to only the "terms
and conditions" of the order once it is issued? This ambiguity was
compounded by the Supreme Court Rules, which state that once the
plaintiff's affidavit has been filed and the bond approved, "the clerk
shall issue a writ" for seizure of the alleged infringing articles.5 4 In
Duchess Music Corp. v. Stern,55 the Ninth Circuit, while speaking
in the context of the scope of articles to be seized under section
101(c) and the Rules, seemed to indicate that the court must issue a
writ of seizure once the plaintiff has formally complied with the
Rules.
Any ambiguity that existed was resolved by section 503(a) of
the 1976 Act, which states that "the court may order the impounding, on such terms as it may deem reasonable," of all infringing articles.5e Even though some discretion was exercised by courts
under the 1909 Act, 57 more discretion has been shown in ordering
impoundment and in shaping individual orders under the 1976 Act,
particularly when the plaintiff requests a temporary restraining order
or preliminary injunction at the same time as an order of
After awarding summary judgment to plaintiff, the court ordered the defendants and "their
agents, employees, successors, and assigns, and such persons, firms and corporations to whom

delivery has been made of, or in whose possession or under whose control there is, the whole or
any part or parts of the said musical compositions" to deliver such articles up for impoundment. Id. See also Baez v. Fantasy Records, Inc., 144 U.S.P.Q. 537 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1964)

(very broad scope of destruction order after a finding of common law copyright infringement).
53. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075, reprintedin 17 U.S.C.A. at 235 (West
Supp. 1985) (repealed 1978).
54. 17 U.S.C.A. foil. § 501, Rule 4 (West 1977) (emphasis added).

55. 458 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 847 (1972). "Neither the statute
nor the Supreme Court Rules give the District Court any discretion to determine what to
impound or what to destroy. The process Congress granted the aggrieved copyright proprietor

is a summary one. .

.

.It is to impound everything the plaintiff alleges infringes his copy-

right." Id. at 1308 (emphasis in original).
56. 17 U.S.C. § 503(a) (1982) (emphasis added).
57. Ted Arnold, Ltd. v. Silvercraft Co., 259 F. Supp. 733, 736 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (court

issued a preliminary injunction, but denied plaintiff's request for impoundment, "there being
no extraordinary circumstances to require it"); Miller v. Goody, 125 F. Supp. 348 (S.D.N.Y.

1954) (impoundment of defendant's music recording equipment ordered until royalties and
damages were paid and notice given to distributors); Elektra Records Co. v. Gem Elec. Distrib., Inc., 360 F. Supp. 821 (E.D.N.Y. 1973) (cassette-copying machine seized upon initiation

of action, but returned to defendant after preliminary injunction issued).
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impoundment. 58
Given the near total discretion of courts to order impoundment,
it is not surprising that a wide variety of rationales are used to justify seizures. In Jewelers' CircularPublishingCo. v. Keystone Pub-

lishing Co.,59 for example, Judge Learned Hand wrote "I take it as

patent that the 'impounding' is only to assure the eventual destruc-

tion of the infringing articles." In other instances, however, impoundment may be considered the only effective way to halt the in-

fringer's activities. In Wallace Berrie & Co. v. Custom Styled Toys,
Inc.,60 the plaintiff filed a complaint claiming that its copyrighted
"Smurf" toys were being infringed by the defendant."" Subsequently,
the plaintiff made ex parte requests for a temporary restraining order and a writ of seizure. 2 The court granted both requests based on
affidavits showing that the defendant had continued making and selling the alleged infringing toys after the complaint had been filed,
rather than storing them pending the outcome of the trial.63 The
seizure of the alleged infringing copies and other instrumentalities
for making such copies may be ordered, therefore, to preserve the
status quo between the parties pending trial on the merits, and to

remove the infringing articles from the market, particularly in cases
involving large-scale piracy of the plaintiff's copyrighted work."
58. See Power Lawn Mower Parts, Inc. v. Lawn Mower Parts, Inc., COPYRIGHT L.
DEcs. (CCH) 25,317 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 1981), where the court issued a preliminary injunction against defendant's catalog, but refused to order impoundment, stating that the plaintiff "has made no showing that an order prohibiting defendants from utilizing the infringing
catalogs will not be sufficient to protect it." Id. at 16,799. The court added that "to the
extent that plaintiff seeks to force defendants to deliver plates and materials used to prepare
the catalog, impoundment is not an available remedy." Id. See also RCA Records v. All-Fast
Systems, Inc., COPYRIGHT L. DEcs. (CCH) 25,704 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 1984) (a preliminary
injunction was granted, but impoundment of the defendant's "Rezound" cassette-copying machine was not ordered where the court found the machine had significant noninfringing uses,
even though the defendant continued using the machine for infringing purposes after the action was commenced); WPOW, Inc. v. MRLJ Enter., 584 F. Supp. 132 (D.D.C. 1984) (court
held that discretion given courts to order impoundment under § 503(a) of the 1976 Act impliedly required a fuller evidentiary hearing than summary proceedings under the old act approved by the Ninth Circuit in Duchess); Clark Equip. Co. v. Harlan Corp., 539 F. Supp. 561
(D. Kan. 1982) (court dissolved a writ of seizure already executed upon after plaintiff's subsequent motion for a preliminary injunction was denied).
59. 274 F. 932, 936 (S.D.N.Y. 1921), affd, 281 F. 83 (2d Cir. 1922), cert. denied, 259
U.S. 581 (1923).
60. COPYRIGHT L. DEcs. (CCH) 25,492 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 1982).
61. Id. at 1 17,929.
62. Id.
63. Id. The opinion does not state who the affiants were, what facts they alleged, or
what formed the basis of their beliefs.
64. See Duchess Music Corp. v. Stern, 458 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
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defendant's liability and culpability, depending on the number of
copies seized, or may even substantiate the plaintiff's infringement
claim by providing the plaintiff with proof of the instrumentalities

and other means for making the infringing copies. Evidence of the
materials seized, as well as statements made by the defendant during

the seizure, have been used to support a finding of infringement.7"
Writs of seizure have also been used to seize materials that do not

themselves infringe, but which give evidence of the defendant's infringing activities, such as advertising and promotional materials,
business records, or materials not yet made into the infringing

article.
E.

71

The Showing Required for an Order of Impoundment

Some commentators have argued that the prefatory language of
section 101 - "[i]f any person shall infringe" 72 - requires the

plaintiff to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits in the
underlying infringement action. 73 Although no case decided under

the 1909 Act relied on this language, some courts ordered impoundment only after a preliminary injunction hearing. 74 Several other
70. Warner Bros., Inc. v. Kalish, 201 U.S.P.Q. 768 (W.D.N.Y. 1978).
71. See, e.g., Dealer Advertising Dev., Inc. v. Barbara Allan Fin. Advertising, Inc., 209
U.S.P.Q. 1003 (W.D. Mich. 1979) (unproduced radio scripts allegedly infringing radio commercials, and rate sheets seized); Mode Art Jewelry Co. v. Expansion Jewelry, Ltd., 199
U.S.P.Q. 329 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (advertising and promotional materials related to sales of infringing jewelry seized). In Universal Pictures Co. v. Schaeffer, 140 U.S.P.Q. 17 (E.D. Pa.
1963), marshals seized several copies of motion pictures named in the writ of seizure, but did
not seize records regarding sales or rentals of the infringing materials. Id. at 19-20. In Midway
Mfg. Co. v. Omni Video Games, Inc., 668 F.2d 70 (Ist Cir. 1981), however, one copy of the
defendant's allegedly infringing video game was impounded pursuant to a writ of seizure. Id.
at 71. The district court subsequently vacated the writ, stating that it had been "based on
inaccurate information," and suppressed the game, holding that its seizure had been "unnecessary." Id. The First Circuit affirmed the lower court's exercise of discretion in suppressing all
evidence obtained as a result of the execution of the writ of seizure, holding that, since the
primary purpose of impoundment was to secure the infringing works for destruction, the plaintiff would not be hurt if the writ was vacated and only one copy of the defendant's allegedly
infringing work was lost for destruction. Id. The First Circuit also indicated that if the district
court's order of suppression was reversed on final appeal and the infringing copy had disappeared, the plaintiff would still have "the account by the individuals involved in the seizure of
what they saw and heard." Id. at 72.
72. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075, reprintedin 17 U.S.C.A. at 234 (West
Supp. 1985) (repealed 1978).
73. See Alexander, supra note 66, at 489-90; Comment, PretrialRemedies in Infringement Actions: The Copyright Holder's Impound of Flesh?, 17 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 885, 895
(1977).
74. Andre Matenciot, Inc. v. David & Dash, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 1199 (S.D.N.Y. 1976);
Roy Export Co. v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 344 F. Supp. 1350 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
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Courts are more likely to order impoundment for this reason in cases
where the threat of irreparable injury is particularly great.6 5
Another rationale for impoundment and destruction is the desire
to punish the alleged copyright infringer and deter others, particularly in cases of piracy. 66 The impoundment and destruction provisions are "highly penal"67 in nature and courts often order impoundment where it appears that the defendant's infringement is willful.
In Wallace Berrie, a temporary restraining order was issued where

the defendant continued to make and sell allegedly infringing copies
after the action commenced and had been a defendant in a previous
copyright infringement action involving the same goods. 68 In another
case, a court found the defendant in contempt and ordered impoundment where the defendant willfully violated an injunction issued in a
prior infringement action between the same parties.69
The final, and perhaps most significant, purpose of impoundment is to seize evidence of the defendant's infringing activities. Evidence obtained by a writ of seizure may determine the extent of a
847 (1972); Jondora Music Publishing Co. v. Melody Recordings, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 572
(D.N.J. 1972).
65. Nintendo of Am., Inc. v. Elcon Indus., Inc., 564 F. Supp. 937, 942 (E.D. Mich.
1982). The court initially issued a temporary restraining order and an order of impoundment.
Id. at 938. In subsequently issuing a preliminary injunction, the court emphasized the plaintiff's enormous expense in developing its video game and the ease with which such a game may
be copied by others. Id. at 942. The court went on to state:
The commercial life of audio-visual games is notoriously short. Despite the tremendous popularity of the [plaintiff's] game, most of its sales are likely to occur during
the first six to twelve months of its commercial life, and thereafter the game's popularity is expected to drop sharply. The sale of [infringing] copies of [the plaintiff's
game] poses an immediate and serious threat to the plaintiff's business.
Id. In Cassidy v. Bowlin, COPYRIGHT L. DEcs. (CCH) 25,437 (W.D. Mo. Apr. 9, 1982), a
preliminary injunction was entered with the consent of the parties and was reviewed by the
court two months later. The court reissued the preliminary injunction and ordered impoundment of the defendant's allegedly infringing photographs and all means for making them. The
court emphasized the potential irreparable harm to the plaintiff's reputation as a nature photographer from the publication of the defendant's works. Id.
66. Alexander, Discretionary Power to Impound & Destroy Infringing Articles: An
Historical Perspective, 29 J. COPYR. Soc. 479 (1982).
67. Jewelers' Circular, 274 F. 932, 936 (S.D.N.Y. 1921), affd, 281 F. 83 (2d Cir.
1922), cert. denied, 259 U.S. 581 (1923).
68. COPYRIGHT L. DECs. (CCH) 1 25,492 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 1982).
69. National Research Bureau, Inc. v. Kucker, 481 F. Supp. 612, 615 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)
(shopping mall directories impounded). See also Amplex Mfg. Co. v. A.B.C. Plastic
Fabricators, Inc., 184 F. Supp. 285, 288 (E.D. Pa. 1960), where impoundment of all the defendant's infringing catalogs was ordered even though the infringement was minimal and the
plaintiff had not suffered any financial harm from the infringement. The court ordered impoundment and destruction because "the integrity of our Copyright Laws must be protected."
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courts ordered impoundment under the 1909 Act only after a trial or
full evidentiary hearing. 5
The Supreme Court Rules, however, do not require the plaintiff
to make any factual showing on the merits of the underlying claim,

either before or after the writ of seizure is executed. The Rules require only that the plaintiff file an affidavit locating the allegedly
infringing articles and post a bond.7 ' For pretrial seizures ordered ex
parte under the 1909 Act, the weight of authority supports the showing required by the Supreme Court Rules - none at all.7 In these

cases, an order of impoundment was generally prayed for and
granted on the same day the complaint was filed, 7a and the writ of
seizure that was issued pursuant to the order was generally executed
very shortly thereafter."'
There is nothing in the 1976 Act or its legislative history to

indicate that Congress intended a plaintiff to make any showing of a
likelihood of success on the merits before impoundment is ordered.
As one court stated of section 503(a), "[t]he decision to impound is
discretionary with the court; no standards are set out in the

statute." 80
The House Report states that impoundment may be ordered for

allegedly infringing articles "as soon as suit has been filed and with75. Amplex Mfg. Co. v. A.B.C. Plastic Fabricators, Inc., 184 F. Supp. 285 (E.D.N.Y.
1960); Foreign & Domestic Music Corp. v. Michael M. Wyngate, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 82
(S.D.N.Y. 1946).
76. 17 U.S.C.A. foil. § 501, Rule 3 (West 1977). The Rules, however, state that the
order of impoundment may only be obtained "[u]pon the institution of any action." Id. Thus,
the writ of seizure may issue only after the plaintiff has, at least, filed a complaint which
contains some factual allegations.
77. See Duchess Music Corp. v. Stern, 458 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
847 (1972); Crown Feature Film Co. v. Bettis Amusement Co., 206 F. 362 (N.D. Ohio 1913).
78. See Warner Bros., Inc. v. Kalish, 201 U.S.P.Q. 768 (W.D.N.Y. 1978) (writ issued
and executed same day complaint filed); Jondora Music Publishing Co. v. Melody Recordings,
Inc., 351 F. Supp. 572 (D.N.J. 1972) (writ issued and executed one week after complaint
filed); Universal Pictures Co. v. Schaeffer, 140 U.S.P.Q. 17 (E.D. Pa. 1963) (writ issued same
day complaint filed and executed following day); Universal Film Mfg. Co. v. Copperman, 206
F. 69 (S.D.N.Y. 1913), aff'd, 218 F. 577 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 235 U.S. 704 (1914) (writ
issued and executed same day bill filed).
79. Dealer Advertising Dev., Inc. v. Barbara Allan Fin. Advertising, Inc., 197 U.S.P.Q.
611 (W.D. Mich. 1977) (writ executed day after application made and before plaintiff had
even filed amended complaint containing statutory infringement claim); Elektra Records Co. v.
Gem Elec. Distrib., Inc., 360 F. Supp. 821 (E.D.N.Y. 1973) (writ executed one week after
issuance); Jondora Music Publishing Co. v. Melody Recordings, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 572
(D.N.J. 1972) (writ issued and executed same day).
80. Martin Luther King, Jr. Center for Social Change v. American Heritage Prods.,
Inc., 508 F. Supp. 854, 861 (N.D. Ga. 1981), modified and rev'd on other grounds, 694 F.2d

674 (11th Cir. 1983).
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out waiting for an injunction. ''81 Consequently, almost all courts con-

tinue to follow the impoundment procedures of the Supreme Court
Rules when pretrial, ex parte impoundment is sought under the 1976
Act. 82 At the same time, the clear trend under the new act is to
order impoundment and issue a writ of seizure contemporaneously
with the issuance of a temporary restraining order8 3 or a preliminary
injunction.8" This effectively makes an order of impoundment dependent on the showing required by Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure - irreparable injury and a likelihood of success on
the merits. 85

This trend reflects growing judicial unease with the summary
proceedings prescribed by the Supreme Court Rules and represents
an attempt to balance more equitably the interest of both parties in
an impoundment action under the 1976 Act. Although this attempted balancing of the parties' interests is in keeping with recent
Supreme Court opinions regarding due process considerations in pretrial seizures, it has no basis in either section 503(a) or the Supreme
Court Rules. 86
81. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 160 (1976), reprinted in 1976 US. CODE
& AD. NEWS 5776.
82. Midway Mfg. Co. v. Omni Video Games, Inc., 668 F.2d 70 (1st Cir. 1981); Wallace Berrie & Co. v. Custom Styled Toys, Inc., COPYRIGHT L. DEcs. (CCH) T 25,492
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 1982); Clark Equip. Co. v. Harlan Corp., 539 F. Supp. 561 (D. Kan.
1982); Nintendo of Am., Inc. v. Elcon Indus., Inc., 564 F. Supp. 937 (E.D. Mich. 1982);
Midway Mfg. Co. v. Dirkschneider, 215 U.S.P.Q. 336 (D. Neb. 1981); Traditional Living,
Inc. v. Energy Log Homes, Inc., 464 F. Supp. 1025 (N.D. Ala. 1978).
83. Wallace Berrie & Co. v. Marsh, COPYRIGHT L. DECS. (CCH) 1125,512 (C.D. Cal.
Mar. I1, 1983); Wallace Berrie & Co. v. Custom Styled Toys, Inc., COPYRIGHT L. DEcs.
(CCH) 25,492 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 1982); Clark Equip. Co. v. Harlan Corp., 539 F. Supp.
561 (D. Kan. 1982); Nintendo of Am., Inc. v. Elcon Indus., Inc., 564 F. Supp. 937 (E.D.
Mich. 1982).
84. Martin Luther King, Jr. Center for Social Change, Inc. v. American Heritage
Prods., Inc., 508 F. Supp. 854 (N.D. Ga. 1981), modified and rev'd on other grounds, 694
F.2d 674 (11 th Cir. 1983); WPOW, Inc. v. MRLJ Enter., 584 F. Supp. 132 (D.D.C. 1984);
Cassidy v. Bowlin, COPYRIGHT L. DECS. (CCH), 1 25,437 (W.D. Mo. Apr. 9, 1982); Traditional Living, Inc. v. Energy Log Homes, Inc., 464 F. Supp. 1025 (N.D. Ala. 1978); Dollcraft
Indus., Ltd. v. Well-Made Toy Mfg. Co., 479 F. Supp. 1105 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
85. FED. R. Civ. P. 65. The standard for issuing preliminary injunctions was stated in
Wainwright Sec., Inc. v. Wall St. Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91, 94 (2d Cir. 1977): "[A]
preliminary injunction can be granted if plaintiff shows irreparable injury, combined with either a probability of success on the merits, or a fair ground for litigation and a balance of the
hardships in his favor." Id. There are still courts, however, that order impoundment on nothing
more than compliance with the Supreme Court Rules under the new act. See Midway Mfg.
Co. v. Omni Video Games, Inc., 668 F.2d 70 (1st Cir. 1981); Midway Mfg. Co. v.
Dirkschneider, 215 U.S.P.Q. 336 (D. Neb. 1981).
86. In passing § 503(a) in its present form, Congress declined the opportunity to make
notice and a showing of irreparable injury a prerequisite of impoundment. Congress, however,
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F.

The Release of Impounded Articles

Neither section 101 nor section 503 makes any provision for release of the impounded articles.81 The procedures a defendant must
follow are governed by the Supreme Court Rules.

8

Under the Rules,

the defendant may serve an exception to the plaintiff's bond or sureties within three days after the articles are seized 8 9 If the defendant
does not except, he or she may apply to the court "for the return
. . .of the articles seized, upon filing an affidavit stating all material
facts and circumstances tending to show that the articles seized are

not infringing copies, records, plates, molds, matrices, or means for
making the copies alleged to infringe the copyright." 90

If such an application is made, the court has the discretion to
order the return of the property upon the defendant's filing of a bond

at a price fixed by the court. 9' The burden of proof is on the defendalso passed over the chance to fully legitimize the Supreme Court Rules, either by incorporating them into the statute or approving their use in the legislative history of the new act. See
supra note 23. It may be that by placing almost total discretion to order impoundment in the
hands of the courts, Congress recognized the special problems that arise from impoundment
under the copyright act and intended courts to use their discretion to fashion impoundment
orders appropriate to the factual circumstances of each case. See WPOW, Inc. v. MRLJ
Enter., 584 F. Supp. 132, 134-35 (D.D.C. 1984).
Such a congressional intent may also be read from the impoundment provision in the
Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984. 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-914 (Supp. 11 1984). Section
911 (e)(1) states that applications for orders of impoundment made under this act for seizure
of semiconductor chip products shall be heard and determined in the same manner as temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions-but only "[ijnsofar as practicable." 17
U.S.C. § 91 l(e)(l) (Supp. II 1984) (emphasis added). The implication of this phrase is that
courts may exercise their discretion and dispense with the procedural requirements of Rule 65
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when they are impracticable. The legislative history of
this section reflects unease with the existing impoundment procedures, but also does not embrace wholeheartedly the procedures of Rule 65. See H.R. REP. No. 1062, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. 3335 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE & AD. NEWS 5708.
87. One court has held that under § 503 the authority to vacate an order of impoundment is implied in the authority and discretion given by the copyright act to order impoundment. The court failed, however, to specify the procedures to be followed in exercising that
discretion. Midway Mfg. Co. v. Omni Video Games, Inc., 668 F.2d 70 (Ist Cir. 1981).
88. 17 U.S.C.A. foil. § 501 (West 1977). See Crown Feature Film Co. v. Bettis
Amusement Co., 206 F. 362, 363 (N.D. Ohio 1913), where the court held that "[t]he only
authority shown to us for a motion to show cause [made by the defendant for the release of the
impounded articles] is found in rules 9, 10, and 11 of the Supreme Court."
89. 17 U.S.C.A. foil. § 501, Rule 7 (West 1977).
90. Id. at Rule 9. In Crown Feature Film Co. v. Bettis Amusement Co., 206 F. 362,
363 (N.D. Ohio 1913), the court denied the defendant's motion for release of the impounded
articles because, although the defendants had submitted some proof that they were in lawful
possession of the motion picture print seized, they had failed to show that the prints were not
infringing copies.
91. 17 U.S.C.A. foil. § 501, Rule 10 (West 1977).
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ant at such a hearing and there is no time limit within which the
hearing must be held, or within which a final judicial determination
must be made on the validity of the seizure or on the underlying
question of infringement. Further, as minimal as the procedures are
for obtaining a writ of seizure under the Supreme Court Rules,92
irregularities in following them are not necessarily fatal to the
93

seizure.
In addition to showing that the impounded articles do not infringe, release of the articles may be obtained by a showing that the
factual allegations supporting the writ of seizure were false or misleading. In Jondora Music Publishing Co. v. Melody Recordings,
Inc., 4 the plaintiffs applied for an ex parte writ of seizure on the
same day they filed their verified complaint.9 5 The application was
supported by the averments of the verified complaint, affidavits of
the plaintiffs, and bonds.96 Both the complaint and the affidavits
made lengthy factual allegations that the defendant was a "bootlegger" and a music tape "pirate," whose operation would go underground and be secretly moved to another location unless the writ of
seizure was ordered ex parte.9 7 The court issued the writ ex parte
one week after the application was made.98
At the hearing held on the defendant's motions to quash the
writ of seizure and vacate the injunction, the court found that the
defendant had been making substantial royalty payments to the
plaintiffs and had otherwise complied with the compulsory license
provisions of the copyright act.99 The court granted the defendant's
motions because the plaintiffs had failed to convey these material
facts to the court, and had made "shocking misstatements" in their
verified complaint and affidavits that "practiced a fraud" on the
92. See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
93. See Midway Mfg. Co. v. Dirkschneider, 215 U.S.P.Q. 336, 337 (D. Neb. 1981).
The court held that: (1) the plaintiff only needed one surety to secure the order of impoundment rather than the two required by Rule 3; (2) the plaintiff's bond was inadequate in light
of the value of the goods actually seized, but the plaintiff had ten days to increase the bond to
the appropriate amount pursuant to Rule 7; and (3) the marshal was not required by Rule 5 to
serve the affidavit locating and valuing the goods on the defendant at the time of seizure
because Rule 3 only required "that service of the affidavit shall be made by the marshal." Id.
94. 351 F. Supp. 572 (D.N.J. 1972).
95. Id. at 572-73.
96. Id. at 573.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 573-76.
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court.'
The Supreme Court Rules require that the plaintiff post a bond
to be used for payment to the defendant of any damages which the

court might subsequently award.'10 This provision appears to grant
courts complete discretion, particularly since neither the copyright
act nor the Rules contain any standards for deciding when damages
are to be awarded. Nevertheless, damages in connection with impoundment are rarely discussed or awarded by courts. Despite strong

language condemning the plaintiffs' actions in obtaining the writ of
seizure, the Jondora court found that the plaintiffs were in technical

compliance with the Supreme Court Rules and did not award damages for the wrongful seizure. The court merely vacated the writ

upon equitable principles and ordered return of the articles seized. 02
One early court, in Universal Film ManufacturingCo. v. Copperman,l0 3 affirmed an award of damages after finding that the de-

fendant's one positive print of a 1912 motion picture did not infringe
the plaintiff's copyright. 04 The amount of the award for wrongful

seizure was determined by analogizing to damages awarded for
100. Id. See also Midway Mfg. Co. v. Omni Video Games, Inc., 668 F.2d 70, 71 (1st
Cir. 1981) (court affirmed decision to vacate order of impoundment that had been "unnecessary" and "based on inaccurate information"). In these cases, the plaintiffs, proceeding under
the Supreme Court Rules, were not required to make any showing as to their alleged need for
swift, ex parte relief. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
101. See 17 U.S.C.A. foil. § 501, Rule 4 (West 1977).
102. 351 F. Supp. at 576. Even more recently than Jondora, a case named Dealer Advertising Dev., Inc. v. Barbara Allan Fin. Advertising, Inc., 197 U.S.P.Q. 611 (W.D. Mich.
1977), 209 U.S.P.Q. 1003 (W.D. Mich. 1979), was decided that illustrated perfectly the kinds
of abuses made possible by the procedures for impoundment under the copyright act. The
procedural failures here, which arose from a very complex factual situation, were many. First,
seizure of the defendant's alleged infringing radio advertisement spots, including seizure of
sales brochures for the spots, cassette masters of demos, sets of scripts, rate sheets, and sales
form letters, was ordered under the Supreme Court Rules even before the plaintiff had initiated an action for copyright infringement. 197 U.S.P.Q. at 614. Second, impoundment was
ordered on the basis of a factual record showing that both parties had acted many times in
disregard of the other's rights in the radio spots and in breach of their prior written agreement.
209 U.S.P.Q. at 1007-Il. Third, the court had specifically declined to order a preliminary
injunction regarding the defendant's advertising campaign a few months before impoundment
was ordered, holding that the factual basis for it was insufficient. Id. at 1011. Nevertheless, the
plaintiff was able to obtain an order of impoundment on the same claim with no factual showing at all and with another preliminary injunction motion on that claim pending. Id. at 101112. In view of the parties' poisoned feelings toward each other and the mass of litigation already pending, it appears that the plaintiff's impoundment application was an attempt to place
the defendant at a disadvantage in its litigation before an adversary hearing could be had.
103. 218 F. 577 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 235 U.S. 704 (1914).
104. Id. at 580.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1985

19

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 1 [1985], Art. 10
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 14:211

breach of contract. 10 5 The defendant also recovered attorney's
fees.10 6 In a recent case, the District Court for the District of Rhode
Island vacated a writ of seizure that had been "unnecessary" and
based on inaccurate information. 107 The district court did not award
damages but instead ordered suppression of the evidence seized and
awarded attorney's fees to the defendant.108
The cases indicate that there is no consensus as to what interests should be compensated after a wrongful seizure. The Rhode Island district court used a fourth amendment remedy - suppression
of evidence - to compensate for the violation of the defendant's privacy. The interests protected by the Universal Film court were solely
pecuniary. The Jondora court did not compensate any interest of the
defendant's at all, despite the plaintiffs' flagrant misconduct.
Thus, the remedy of impoundment under the 1976 Act contains
many ambiguities. Under the minimal requirements of the Supreme
Court Rules, courts have nearly total discretion in deciding to order
impoundment. No showing at all of success on the merits or of the
need for swift, ex parte relief is required, and an order of impoundment may extend the scope of seizure to persons in lawful possession
of the infringing articles and to instrumentalities capable of noninfringing uses. The various policies underlying the impoundment remedy have led courts to require widely differing factual showings from
the parties, both in ordering and vacating orders of impoundment.
II.

PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS AND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT

A.

Fundamental Principles

1. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp. and Fuentes v.
Shevin.- In the past two decades, provisional remedies permitting
private parties to obtain ex parte seizure of another's property prior
to judgment have undergone profound change. Beginning in 1969,
105. Id. The district judge had considered the following factors in making the award:
"[t]he condition of the film or reel at the time of seizure and at the present time; the nature of
the employment of the reel at the time of seizure; the rate of such employment and its probable future employment." Id.
106. Id. at 581-82.
107. See Midway Mfg. Co. v. Omni Video Games, Inc., 668 F.2d 70, 71 (Ist Cir. 1981).
The district court opinion is unreported.
108. Id. The district court had held that it was permissible to make an interlocutory
appeal from its order vacating the writ, because it was a final order. The First Circuit held
that an appeal from the order granting the writ was not permissible, because the issuance of
such an order was within the court's discretion and was not subject to review. Id. at 72.
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with Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.,109 the Supreme Court significantly increased the procedural safeguards required by the fifth
amendment before such seizures may lawfully be made.
The Court's decision in Sniadach was motivated by principles
traditionally associated with due process. The Court struck down
Wisconsin's prejudgment garnishment statute because of its fundamental unfairness to debtors.110 Upon a creditor's request, the statute authorized a court clerk to issue a writ of garnishment for up to
fifty percent of a debtor's wages, and provided that the writ could be
served on the garnishee before any notice had been given to the
debtor.""1 The Court found that these procedures enabled creditors
to exert tremendous leverage on debtors for long periods of time
without providing any opportunities for the debtors to be heard or to
tender any defenses.11 2 Further, since the writ could be issued ex
not be
parte, plaintiffs could make fraudulent claims that would
1 13
tested by an adversarial proceeding until trial, if ever.
The due process principles underlying Sniadach were reiterated
and expanded by the Supreme Court three years later in Fuentes v.
Shevin.114 In Fuentes, a creditor claiming that a debtor had defaulted on an installment sales contract, brought a replevin action
for household goods.115 To obtain a writ of replevin, the Florida statute in question required only that the creditor allege in conclusory
form that he or she was lawfully entitled to possession of the property, and that a bond be posted for double the value of the property
to be replevied."' 6 The writ was issued ex parte by a court clerk
without judicial supervision, and no prompt, postseizure hearing was
117
required.
The Supreme Court stated that the debtor has a possessory interest in the property and that seizure of property without notice and
an opportunity to be heard is a substantial invasion of this interest. 8 A seizure ordered ex parte denied the debtor the opportunity
to take part in proceedings that would determine his or her right to
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

395 U.S. 337 (1969).
Id. at 341-42.
Id. at 338.
Id. at 338-39.
See id. at 339.
407 U.S. 67 (1972).
Id. at70.
Id. at 73-74.
Id. at 73-75.
Id. at 80-85.
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possession, an opportunity necessary to protect the individual's dignity and self-respect."" 9 The Court stated that prejudgment seizures
must be accompanied by procedural safeguards adequate to protect
the debtor's use and possession of property from "arbitrary" encroachment.1 20 Such procedures were necessary to minimize the risk
of "substantively unfair or mistaken deprivations of property, a danger that is especially great when the State seizes goods simply upon
the application of and for the benefit of a private party.' 121 The
Court further noted that "notice and an opportunity to be heard
must be granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. ' 122 In light of the interests being protected, the Court held that
notice and a hearing must be granted prior to seizure, except under
extraordinary circumstances. 23
2. Abuses of Copyright Impoundment Procedures. - The risk
of unfair or mistaken deprivations of property is greater under the
Supreme Court Rules than under the statutory schemes in Sniadach
and Fuentes because the Rules do not require a plaintiff to allege,
even conclusorily, that the defendant has no right to possession of
the goods to be seized. 24 In fact, by allowing impoundment at the
request of a self-interested private party without requiring more than
the minimal factual showing in a plaintiff's complaint, the Supreme
Court Rules increase the risk of fraudulent claims. As the court in
Jondora Music Publishing Co. v. Melody Recordings, Inc. found,
granting an order of impoundment without an adversarial hearing
opens the door to the kind of "shocking misstatements" made by the
plaintiffs in that case. 25 It is conceivable that a plaintiff may use
impoundment to pressure recalcitrant or potential licensees. The
likelihood of such claims is also heightened by the fact that, unlike
the parties in Sniadach and Fuentes, the parties in copyright actions
are often business competitors. Sometimes they have had business
relations with each other that soured before the infringement action
119. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 10-7, at 502-03 (1978).
120. 407 U.S. at 81.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 80.
123. See id. at 90-92. Notice and an opportunity to be heard are not required prior to
seizure in "extraordinary situations." Id. at 90 (quoting Boddie v. Conn., 401 U.S. 371, 379
(1971)). These situations occur where the seizure is necessary to secure a crucial governmental
or public interest, there is a need for prompt action, and where the government closely oversees
the seizure procedure. Id. at 91.
124. See supra text accompanying notes 18, 76-77.
125. See supra notes 94-100 and accompanying text.
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was brought.' 2 6 The Rules erect no procedural safeguards against

the kind of sharp dealing and unfair deprivation that may be attempted in such circumstances.
Impoundment of alleged infringing articles will disrupt any de-

fendant's business, and such an order may have an effect on the defendant that is considerably out of proportion to the harm caused to

the plaintiff's copyright by the defendant's alleged infringement.-' 7
For instance, impoundment, by preventing the defendant's use of the
copyrighted work, may also hamper the defendant's sale of goods for
which the copyrighted work is only a sales or operating tool.'2 " If the
impoundment order extends to alleged infringing works in the pos-

session of third parties who are part of the defendant's chain of distribution, the impoundment may severely damage the defendant's

business relationships and sales of noninfringing works.
The risk of unfair and arbitrary deprivations is not limited to
claims brought in bad faith. Impoundment is ordered to secure alleged infringing works for trial and potential destruction. Whether
the defendant's work "infringes" the plaintiff's is a notoriously difficult question, however - far more difficult than the simple claims
for default facing the courts in Sniadach and Fuentes. Ordering impoundment at the request of a self-interested private party, based
upon an underlying infringement claim supported only by the plaintiff's zealous belief that his or her copyrighted work has been infringed, fails to protect against unfair seizures.
126. See, e.g., Dealer Advertising Dev., Inc. v. Barbara Allan Fin. Advertising, Inc., 209
U.S.P.Q. 1003 (W.D. Mich. 1979) (written contract between parties); Jondora Music Publishing Co. v. Melody Recordings, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 572 (D.N.J. 1972) (payment of royalties to
copyright owners); Sub-Contractors Register, Inc. v. McGovern's Contractors & Builders
Manual, Inc., 69 F. Supp. 507 (S.D.N.Y. 1946) (defendant formerly employed by plaintiff);
Universal Film Mfg. Co. v. Copperman, 218 F. 577 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 235 U.S. 704
(1914) (defendant was complainant's assignor).
127. For example, in Clark Equip. Co. v. Harlan Corp., 539 F. Supp. 561, 563-66 (D.
Kan. 1982), the plaintiff manufactured industrial lift trucks and supplied its authorized dealers
with a copyrighted computer program and database on the parts sold by plaintiff for its lifts.
The defendant, an unauthorized dealer, apparently copied the plaintiff's database, and used it
to service plaintiff's lifts. Id. The court vacated an order of impoundment of the defendant's
articles because the interference with his business due to the seizure of such articles outweighed any possible harm infringement would have on the plaintiff. Id. at 570-71.
128. WPOW, Inc. v. MRLJ Enter., 584 F. Supp. 132 (D.D.C. 1984) (impoundment of
defendant's architectural plans that were appended to an FCC application competing with the
plaintiff's application); Power Lawn Mower Parts v. Lawn Mower Parts, COPYRIGHT L. DEcs.
(CCH) 1 25,317 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 1981) (plaintiff requested that defendant turn over all
purchase orders received through its infringing use of plaintiff's catalog); Traditional Living,
Inc. v. Energy Log Homes, Inc., 464 F. Supp. 1024 (N.D. Ala. 1978) (impoundment ordered
for defendants' sales catalogs).
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Furthermore, as commercial exploitation of copyrights leads to
increasingly complex business relationships, the need for an adversarial hearing increases to assure the accuracy of a court's finding
that a defendant may rightfully be deprived of possession of the alleged infringing works. The potential for error in this regard was
illustrated in Warner Bros., Inc. v. Kalish.2 9 The plaintiffs, several
major motion picture producers and distributors, claimed that the
defendants, a film processing lab and its owner, were making infringing copies of the plaintiffs' copyrighted movies. 130 Despite the significant possibility that a licensing or distributing agreement existed between the plaintiffs and defendants, either directly or through
intermediate parties,"'1 an order of impoundment was granted contemporaneously with the filing of the plaintiffs' complaint and without any notice to the defendant or an opportunity to be heard. 3 2
Perhaps the most serious problem with the Rules' inadequate
procedures is that they require courts to surrender virtually all control over a private party's use of the state's legitimate force. Not
only is that control surrendered as to seizures of alleged infringing
copies, but also as to other means by which such articles may be
reproduced. 33
B.

Balancing the Parties' Interests

1. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co. - Two years after Fuentes
was decided, the Supreme Court upheld, in Mitchell v. W.T. Grant
Co., 34 the constitutionality of an ex parte, prejudgment seizure
under Louisiana's sequestration statute. The Court held that, although the seizure had been obtained ex parte, the statute contained
procedural safeguards constitutionally sufficient to protect against
unfair or mistaken deprivations.' 3 5 First, the availability of sequestration was limited to situations where the debtor had the power to
conceal, dispose of, waste, or remove the property to be sequestered. 36 Second, under the Louisiana statute the creditor was required to allege specific facts based on actual knowledge supporting
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

201 U.S.P.Q. 768 (W.D.N.Y. 1978).
Id. at 768-69.
Id. at 769.
Id. at 768.
See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
416 U.S. 600 (1974).
Id. at 604-05.
Id. at 605.
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the claim for possession. 117 In addition, the application for a writ of
sequestration was made to a judge rather than to a clerk, 138 and the
debtor had a right to a prompt, postseizure hearing at which the
creditor was required to prove the grounds upon which the writ was
issued.139 Finally, the statute provided for damages if there was a
wrongful taking, and the debtor could regain possession by filing a
40
counterbond.1
Although Mitchell implicitly modified Fuentes by allowing ex
parte seizures prior to judgment, the central inquiry remained the
same: Do the procedures for seizures of property prior to judgment
contain adequate safeguards to minimize the risk of unfair or mistaken deprivations? Mitchell differed from Fuentes by requiring that
such procedures strike a balance sufficient to protect the conflicting
interests of both parties in the property to be seized. The Court reasoned that notice to the defendant prior to seizure could defeat the
creditor's interest by giving the defendant an opportunity to conceal,
destroy, remove, or otherwise dispose of the goods to be seized. 41 Ex
parte seizures, the Court noted, may be the only way to adequately
protect a plaintiff's interest against such dangers. 42 Since the Louisiana statute permitted ex parte sequestration only under circumstances where the debtor could defeat legitimate creditor interests,
the Court found that the statute was not violative of due process
requirements. 43
Regarding protection of the debtor's interests, the Court found
that the Louisiana statute's requirements that the affidavit in support
of an application for seizure contain specific facts made by one with
actual knowledge, and that the application be made to a judge, were
sufficient to minimize the defendant's risk of being subjected to an
erroneous deprivation. 4 The Court also noted that the defendant's
137. Id.
138. Id. at 605-06 & n.5.
139. Id. at 606.
140. Id. at 607.
141. Id. at 608-09.
142. Id. at 609.
143. Id. at 610. The debtor in Mitchell made only a conclusory allegation that it "had
reason to believe petitioner would 'encumber, alienate or otherwise dispose of the merchandise.'" Id. at 602. Subsequent courts, however, have required plaintiffs to demonstrate the
bases for their belief that an ex parte seizure is necessary to prevent defeating the plaintiff's
interest. Guzman v. Western State Bank, 516 F.2d 125 (8th Cir. 1975); Springdale Farms,
Inc. v. Mcllroy Bank & Trust, 281 Ark. 371, 663 S.W.2d 936 (1984); Michigan State Treasurer v. Turner, 110 Mich. App. 228, 312 N.W.2d 418 (1981).
144. 416 U.S. at 609-10.
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right to a prompt, postseizure hearing, at which the plaintiff would
bear the burden of proving the grounds upon which the writ was
swiftly serve to correct and redress any wrongful
issued, would
145
deprivations.
In permitting ex parte seizures in some situations, the Mitchell
Court seemed to emphasize the importance of the pecuniary interests
at stake in a seizure, rather than the liberty or privacy interests that
were emphasized in Fuentes. Minimizing the risk of mistaken or unfair deprivations, however, still lies at the heart of fifth amendment
and Mitchell have continprocedural due process, and both Fuentes
46
law.1
the
of
area
this
in
vitality
uing
2. Lack of Procedural Safeguards in the Supreme Court
Rules. - The procedures for obtaining an order of impoundment
under the 1976 Act 4 7 and the Supreme Court Rules'4 8 do little, if
anything, to safeguard defendants against mistaken deprivations.
Under these procedures, a plaintiff need not allege specific facts supporting the underlying copyright infringement claim. Indeed, the application may be made by one without actual knowledge, such as the
plaintiff's authorized agent or attorney. 4 9 Further, neither the statute nor the Rules limits the remedy of impoundment to situations
where the plaintiff may suffer irreparable injury or the defendant
may conceal, dispose of, or waste the infringing articles. 50 Although
the application and issuance of an ex parte order of impoundment is
made under judicial supervision, this procedural safeguard is rendered meaningless by the absence of a requirement for a factual
showing in the application.' 5 ' Without such a showing the court's
on the formal suffidiscretion is reduced to little more than passing
52
ciency of the plaintiff's affidavit and bond.
145. See id. at 610.
146. Often, courts rely on both Fuentes and Mitchell when performing the due process
analysis. See, e.g., Guzman v. Western State Bank, 516 F.2d 125 (8th Cir. 1975); Keelon v.
Davis, 475 F. Supp. 204 (N.D. Miss. 1979); Michigan State Treasurer v. Turner, 110 Mich.
App. 228, 312 N.W.2d 418 (1981); Peebles v. Clement, 63 Ohio St. 2d 314, 408 N.E.2d 689
(1980); General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Hatch, 3 Ohio App. 3d 80, 443 N.E.2d 1054 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1982). See also Terranova v. Avco Fin. Servs. of Barre, Inc., 396 F. Supp. 1402 (D. Vt.
1975) (Fuentes decision required notice and a hearing be provided prior to nonpossessory
seizure).
147. See supra text accompanying notes 9-11.
148. See supra text accompanying note 14.
149. See supra text accompanying note 17.
150. See supra notes 29-45 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text.
152. See supra text accompanying notes 17-20.
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Impoundment procedures do provide for a postseizure hearing,
after which the court may order return of the impounded articles.153
The burden is on the defendant, however, to move for such a hearing
by stating in an affidavit all material facts and circumstances tending to prove that the seized articles do not violate the plaintiff's
copyright.15 4 The plaintiff is not required to prove the grounds upon
which the writ was issued. If the defendant prevails at the hearing,
the court may order return of the impounded articles, but only after
the defendant has posted a counterbond.' 55 Unlike the defendant in
Mitchell, a defendant in an impoundment proceeding may not obtain
return of the articles seized simply by posting a bond. 156 The Rules
state that the court may order an award of damages if the articles
seized are later released.15 No such award is mandatory, however,
and damages for wrongful impoundment are rarely awarded by
courts in copyright actions. 58 Thus, the deterrent effect of possible
damage awards on plaintiffs with baseless claims is negligible. In
short, the Rules fail to satisfy the procedural criteria of Mitchell.
The Rules provisions that do address Mitchell requirements - a
writ issued under judicial supervision, a postseizure hearing, and
insufficient to safeguard
damages for wrongful seizure - are each
59
deprivations.
unfair
or
against mistaken
The Rules completely lack any requirement that the plaintiff
allege specific facts in support of the application for an order of impoundment or that the debtor receive notice prior to seizure. In
153.
154.

17 U.S.C.A. foil. § 501, Rule 10 (West 1977).
17 U.S.C.A. foil. § 501, Rule 9 (West 1977). See Crown Feature Film Co. v. Bettis

Amusement Co., 206 Fed. 362 (N.D. Ohio 1913), where the court stated that the only authority for a motion to release impounded articles is found in the Supreme Court Rules 9, 10, and
11. But see Midway Mfg. Co. v. Omni Video Games, Inc., 668 F.2d 70,71 (Ist Cir. 1981) and
Jondora Music Publishing Co. v. Melody Recordings, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 572, 576 (D.N.J.
1972), where the courts returned articles seized after the defendants demonstrated that the

plaintiffs' statements in obtaining the writs were false.
155.

17 U.S.C.A. foil. § 501, Rule 10 (West 1977).

156.

In Guzman v. Western State Bank, 516 F.2d 125, 131 (8th Cir. 1975), the court

struck down a state prejudgment attachment statute that, inter alia, required that the defendant post a bond equal to the value of the property seized, before he could challenge the statute.
157. 17 U.S.C.A. foil. § 501, Rule 4 (West 1977). Given the different interests protected
by Fuentes and Mitchell, the basis of such an award is uncertain. See supra text accompany-

ing notes 101-07 (damages awarded for impoundment of alleged infringing works).
158.

See supra notes 101-108 and accompanying text. Although the statute approved in

Mitchell did not require an award of damages for wrongful seizure, one court has since held
that a similar statute does. See Springdale Farms, Inc. v. Mcllroy Bank & Trust, 281 Ark.
371, 663 S.W.2d 936 (1984).
159. See supra notes 151-58 and accompanying text.
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Mitchell the Louisiana statute limited ex parte sequestration to situations where the defendant could conceal, dispose of, or waste the
property to be sequestered. 160 The summary procedures and widereaching scope of the impoundment remedy are arguably necessary
to prevent copyright pirates from escaping from the jurisdiction
pending a hearing or trial on the merits.161 A survey of the case law,
however, shows that many defendants against whom impoundment is
ordered are established businesses engaged for the most part in lawful business activities. It is unlikely that such defendants or the infringing articles and instrumentalities would escape the judgment of
1 62
the court.

The impoundment procedures set forth in the Rules fail to adequately balance the parties' interests in the alleged infringing articles. The scales are weighted entirely in the plaintiff's favor; the defendant's pecuniary interest in the alleged infringing works receives
little or no protection. It would be more appropriate, however, for
the procedural safeguards surrounding impoundment to exceed the
standards set forth in Mitchell. In upholding the Louisiana sequestration statute's constitutionality, the Mitchell Court noted that the
issues involved in debtor/creditor relations are "ordinarily uncomplicated matters that lend themselves to documefitary proof."' 63 In contrast, the factual circumstances and legal issues surrounding copyright infringement are often complex and difficult.'" Furthermore,
although impoundment may have as drastic an effect on the defendant as the seizures of the debtors' wages and household goods did in
Sniadach, Fuentes, and Mitchell, the impact will be even greater if
instrumentalities and other means for making the infringing works
are also seized along with the infringing copies, or if the order of
160. 416 U.S. 600, 605 (1974).
161. See, e.g., Jewelers' Circular Publishing Co. v. Keystone Publishing Co., 274 F. 932
(S.D.N.Y. 1921), affd, 281 F. 83 (2d Cir. 1922), cert. denied, 259 U.S. 581 (1923).
162. In reported opinions, courts ordering impoundment often do not provide much information about the defendant's business or personal ties to the community. In the following
cases, however, impoundment was ordered against substantial businesses without a showing
that the plaintiff had reason to believe that the infringing articles or businesses themselves
would escape the court's jurisdiction before a hearing could be had: Warner Bros., Inc. v.
Kalish, 201 U.S.P.Q. 768 (W.D.N.Y. 1978) (infringing copies and instrumentalities seized
from defendant's film-processing lab); Dealer Advertising Dev., Inc. v. Barbara Allan Fin.
Advertising, Inc., 197 U.S.P.Q. 611 (W.D. Mich. 1977) (defendant's radio advertisements and
other related materials seized); Elektra Records Co. v. Gem Elec. Distrib., Inc., 360 F. Supp.
821 (E.D.N.Y. 1973) (Make-a-Tape machine seized from defendant's music store).
163. 416 U.S. 600, 609 (1974).

164. See generally 3 M.

NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT

ch. 13 (1985) (discussing

substantive aspects of infringement actions).
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impoundment extends to the defendant's bailees or distributors.'6 5

Despite the unfair and arbitrary deprivations copyright defendants may be exposed to by the present impoundment procedures,

those procedures have been upheld against fifth amendment challenges." 6 Subsequent to Sniadach and Fuentes, only one court has
extensively addressed the constitutionality of the impoundment procedures under the fifth amendment. 6 7 That court held that the impoundment procedures comply with the constitutional mandate of
the fifth amendment, stating that Sniadach and Fuentes were not on
point.' 8 The court stated that because provisions exist in the Su-

preme Court Rules for relief from a seizure, the constitutional requirements were satisfied.'6 9 Clearly, the court was erroneous. Sniadach, Fuentes, and Mitchell, and other cases passing on the
constitutionality of statutes permitting ex parte seizures prior to
judgment at the request of private parties, are relevant to the issue

of impoundment under the copyright act. Before turning to a discussion of constitutionally adequate impoundment procedures, the first

and fourth amendment implications for seizures under the copyright
act must be examined.
III.

SEARCHES, SEIZURES, AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

A.

The ConstitutionalRequirements

The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution preserves the "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures" and
requires that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause...
165. The nature of the plaintiff's property interest in the alleged infringing works may
be somewhat less than the creditors' interests in Sniadach. Fuentes, and Mitchell. The copyright plaintiff's interest arises by statute and not by contract, and the copyright act does not
give a plaintiff a possessory interest in a defendant's works, even after they have been found to
infringe. Section 503(b) of the 1976 Act provides for destruction of articles found to infringe,
and § 202 expressly distinguishes ownership of a copyright from ownership of the material
object in which the work is embodied. 17 U.S.C. § 202 (1982).
166. See, e.g., Dealer Advertising Dev., Inc. v. Barbara Allan Fin. Advertising, Inc., 197
U.S.P.Q. 611 (W.D. Mich. 1977); Universal Film Mfg. Co. v. Copperman, 206 F. 69
(S.D.N.Y. 1913), af'd, 218 F. 577 (2d Cir), cert. denied, 235 U.S. 704 (1914).
167. Jondora Music Publishing Co. v. Melody Recordings, Inc., 362 F. Supp. 494
(D.N.J. 1973). Mitchell was decided subsequent to Jondora. In Dealer Advertising Dev., Inc.
v. Barbara Allan Fin. Advertising, Inc., 197 U.S.P.Q. 611, 614 (W.D. Mich. 1977), the court
approved the Jondoracourt's decision regarding the fifth amendment in one sentence without
discussion.
168. Id. at 499.
169. Id. The court apparently overlooked the Fuentes Court's holding that due process
requires a hearing prior to seizure. Fuentes, 407 U.S. 67, 81 (1972).
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and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person
or things to be seized." 170 The basic purpose of the fourth amendment is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against
arbitrary and oppressive invasions by governmental officials.' 71 Except in certain carefully defined circumstances, a search or seizure of
private property without proper consent is unreasonable, unless it has
been authorized by a valid search warrant.17 2 The Supreme Court
has held that the fourth amendment prohibition against warrantless
intrusions protects commercial buildings as well as private homes,' 73
1 74
and applies to civil, as well as to criminal, searches and seizures.
An evidentiary showing sufficient to justify issuance of a search
warrant must demonstrate that there is probable cause to believe
that the items sought are connected to a criminal or civil violation,
and that these items will be found in the place to be searched.175
Both the probable cause and particularity requirements of the fourth
amendment are designed to take evidential evaluation and discretion
out of the hands of officers in the field and to place it in the hands of
neutral and detached judges and magistrates. 7 The factual showing
presently required by the impoundment procedures, even if the application is considered in conjunction with a verified complaint that
makes out a prima facie case of copyright infringement, does not
necessarily give rise to probable cause for the writ of seizure. 77 The
applicant is not required by these procedures to state how the arti170. U.S. CONST., amend. IV.
171. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967) ("The Fourth Amendment
thus gives concrete expression to a right of the people which is basic to a free society.").
172. Id. at 528-29.
173. See, e.g., Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978) (warrant required for
inspection of business premises under the Occupational Safety and Health Act); Camara v.
Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (warrant required for health inspection of private residence); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967) (warrant required for fire inspectors to
search commercial warehouse),
174. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978). See, e.g., Bormann v. Tomlin, 461
F. Supp. 193 (S.D. 11. 1978) (warrant required where tax collection officials search for and
seize property as payment for delinquent taxes).
175. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 556 (1978). The Court stated that "a less
stringent standard of probable cause is acceptable where the entry is not to secure evidence of
crime against the possessor." Id.
176. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964). See also Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436
U.S, 307 (1978), where the Court stated that the safeguard of a neutral judicial officer evaluating evidence and determining whether probable cause for a search exists is also required for
civil searches. Id. at 323. Without such a safeguard, the Court found, the authority to conduct
civil searches would vest executive and administrative officers with almost unbridled discretion
to decide when to search, whom to search, and what to search for. Id.
177. See supra text accompanying notes 73-85.
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des to be seized are connected to the alleged copyright infringement.
An even more serious problem is created by the failure of the
impoundment procedures to require that a writ of seizure describe
the places to be searched and the things to be seized with particular71 the Supreme
ity. In the leading case of Marron v. United States,7
Court stated: "The requirement that warrants shall particularly describe the things to be seized makes general searches under them
impossible and prevents the seizure of one thing under a warrant
describing another. As to what is to be taken, nothing is left to the
discretion of the officer executing the warrant. '179 The particularity
requirement ensures the guarantees of the fourth amendment by forbidding the indiscriminate mass seizures possible under general warrants and by giving notice to the party being searched of the limits
of the search.180 The underlying measure of the adequacy of the
description in the search warrant is whether, given the specificity of
the description, a violation of personal rights by seizure of non-offending items and invasion of privacy is likely. s
Not surprisingly, search warrants for criminal copyright infringements are required to adhere scrupulously to the particularity
requirement. Warrants describing the items sought in generic terms
will be invalidated, and evidence seized pursuant to such warrants
will be suppressed.1 82 References in warrants to "illegally reproduced
and stolen copies, '1 83 or to "certain 8-track electronic tapes and tape
cartridges which are unauthorized 'pirate' reproductions,"18 4 have
been held to be too general to assure that executing officers will be
able to distinguish authorized copies from those illegally reproduced,
thus increasing the likelihood of a violation of personal rights.185 The
required degree of specificity increases where the unauthorized copies are intermingled with lawful ones, particularly where execution
of the warrant will have a substantial impact on the defendant's le178.
179.

275 U.S. 192 (1927).
Id. at 196. But see Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 479-82 (1976) (Court

construed phrase in search warrant---"together with other fruits, instrumentalities and evidence of crime at this [time] unknown"--to be limited by the list of specific items to be seized
immediately preceding it).

180. United States v. Marti, 421 F.2d 1263, 1268 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
947 (1971).

181.

United States v. Klein, 565 F.2d 183, 189 (1st Cir. 1977).

182. See United States v. Drebin, 557 F.2d 1316, 1322-23 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
436 U.S. 904 (1978).
183. Id.
184. United States v. Klein, 565 F.2d 183, 184 (Ist Cir. 1977).
185. See supra notes 182-84.
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gal business activities. 186 The fact that the executing agents are accompanied by industry piracy "experts" or representatives of the

copyright owner will not cure a general warrant. 187
B.

Seizures Under the Copyright Act

A United States marshal, armed with a writ of seizure to impound works alleged to infringe a plaintiff's copyright, may intrude
on a defendant's privacy and security as much as any administrative
officer searching for regulatory violations or law-enforcement officer
searching for evidence of a crime. The impoundment procedures
under the 1976 Act authorize the marshal to use force in seizing the

alleged infringing copies from both a defendant's business and residence.1 88 Writs of seizure have been used to invade places and impound things with regard to which the defendant had a substantial
and reasonable expectation of privacy. 89 The items seized under a
writ have been used as evidence against the defendant in copyright
infringement actions.1 90
The scope of the seizures that may be made by marshals execut-

ing writs under the impoundment procedures are often as broad as
those by government agents executing search warrants in criminal
copyright infringement actions. A writ issued under the Supreme
186. United States v. Klein, 565 F.2d 183, 185 (lst Cir. 1977) (FBI agents seized almost two thousand tapes from defendant's retail music store, approximately 80% of defendant's tape inventory; warrant impermissibly vague); United States v. Drebin, 557 F.2d 1316,
1331-32 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 904 (1978) (FBI agents searched for 18 hours
through inventory of 30,000 reels of film that defendant was lawfully licensed to distribute,
rent, and lease, and seized 551 film prints; description in warrant insufficient).
187. United States v. Klein, 565 F.2d 183 (1st Cir. 1977). Contra United States v. La
Monte, 455 F. Supp. 952 (E.D. Pa. 1978). In LaMonte, expert testimony was used to aid in
discriminating lawful from unlawful copies. The seizure of pirated record albums was not limited to the five titles named in the affidavit and search warrant. Id. at 959-61. The seizure was,
nevertheless, upheld because samples of counterfeit and legitimate records had been shown to
the magistrate prior to issuance of the warrant and characteristics by which they could be
distinguished were pointed out and described in the warrant. Id. These identifying characteristics included the color of the dust jackets, the printed symbols on the record jacket, and symbols and etchings on the disc label. Id. at 960, n.10.
188. See supra text accompanying notes 22, 25-28.
189. See, e.g., Warner Bros., Inc. v. Kalish, 201 U.S.P.Q. 768 (W.D.N.Y. 1978) (movie
print negatives and film-processing equipment seized); Dealer Advertising Dev., Inc. v. Barbara Allan Fin. Advertising, Inc., 197 U.S.P.Q. 611 (W.D. Mich. 1977) (unproduced scripts
for radio advertisements seized).
190. See, e.g., Warner Bros., Inc. v. Kalish, 201 U.S.P.Q. 768 (W.D.N.Y. 1978) (court
expressly used items seized as evidence of infringement). Cf. Midway Mfg. Co. v. Omni Video
Games, Inc., 668 F.2d 70 (1st Cir. 1981) (court suppressed the video game seized, but allowed
individuals involved in the seizure to testify about what they saw and seized).
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Court Rules authorizes a marshal to seize not only alleged infringing
copies, but also instrumentalities (such as plates, molds, matrices,
and so on) and other means for making such infringing copies.19 '
The items to be seized pursuant to a writ of seizure, however, are
frequently described in terms more general than would be allowed in
criminal infringement actions, 192 particularly where piracy is
suspected.'9 3
Furthermore, since there is no preseizure procedure designed to
test the plaintiff's allegations, a writ of seizure may be executed on
any premises where the plaintiff claims the infringing articles are
located.194 In Universal Pictures Co. v. Schaeffer, 95 for example, the
writ of seizure directed the marshal to seize film prints of certain
named motion pictures found "on the person, or in the possession, or
under the control, of the above named defendant, at his place of business . . .and/or at his residence, and/or elsewhere where said de-

fendant, or any agent of said defendant, may be found in the State
of Pennsylvania."' The lack of particularity in describing the place
to be searched in this case created a roving commission with broad
powers to use force to search an indeterminate number of premises.
Given the potential for arbitrary and oppressive invasions of an individual's privacy and security, the fourth amendment safeguards
should be applied to ex parte prejudgment impoundments made
under the copyright act.
IV.

SUPPRESSION OF SPEECH AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

A.

The ConstitutionalRequirements

First amendment values pervade copyright law. A copyrightable
191. See 17 U.S.C. § 503(a), § 509(a) (1982) (permitting seizures similar in scope to
those authorized for criminal infringement actions).
192. See, e.g., Wallace Berrie & Co. v. Custom Styled Toys, Inc., COPYRIGHT L. DECS.
25,492 1 17,929 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 1982) (court ordered seizure of "all copies
(CCH)
alleged to infringe plaintiffs' copyrights and all means for making the same"); Martin Luther
King, Jr. Center for Social Change, Inc. v. American Heritage Prods., Inc., 508 F. Supp. 854
(N.D. Ga. 1981), modified and rev'd on other grounds, 694 F.2d 674 (11th Cir. 1983) (court
ordered seizure of all means for printing the infringing materials in the defendant's "possession
or control").
193. Duchess Music Corp. v. Stern, 458 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 847
(1972). Cf.Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485 (1965) (particularity requirement must be
"accorded the most scrupulous exactitude" when the things to be seized have first amendment
values and "the basis for their seizure is the ideas which they contain").
194. See 17 U.S.C.A. foil. § 501, Rule 3 (West 1977).
195. 140 U.S.P.Q. 17 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
196. Id. at 18.
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"work of authorship" may be a form and medium of communication
or expression. In Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 197 the Supreme
Court discussed the protected speech values present in motion pictures as a class:
It cannot be doubted that motion pictures are a significant medium
for the communication of ideas. They may affect public attitudes
and behavior in a variety of ways, ranging from direct espousal of a
political or social doctrine to the subtle shaping of thought which
characterizesall artisticexpression. The importance of motion pictures as an organ of public opinion is not lessened by the fact that
they are designed to entertain as well as to inform. 19 8
One important commentator on first amendment law has stated that
the first amendment applies to "expressive activity or any conduct
that communicates ideas, information, or emotions, whether verbally,
physically, or otherwise," or that expresses "some proposition or attitude."19 9 Although not all copyrighted works warrant first amendment protection,2 00 all seven of the categories of works protected by
the copyright act should be presumed, in light of the broad definitions of speech above, to encompass a substantial number of works
warranting first amendment protection. 20 1
B.

Regulation of Speech

The first amendment prohibits government action that restrains
speech before it is uttered, published, or otherwise communicated. 202
The rules against such prior restraints apply not only to statutory or
197. 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
198. Id. at 501 (emphasis added).
199. Emerson, First Amendment Doctrine and the Burger Court, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 422,
431-32 (1980).
200. See, e.g., America's Best Family Showplace Corp. v. City of New York, 536 F.
Supp. 170 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (first amendment protection denied for video games; other copyrightable works do not, in and of themselves, warrant first amendment protection).
201. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1982). The seven categories of copyrightable works are: literary
works; musical works, including any accompanying words; dramatic works, including any accompanying music; pantomimes and choreographic works; pictorial, graphic, and sculptural
works; motion pictures and other audiovisual works; and, sound recordings. Id. First amendment values may be found in the following literary or pictorial works: advertisements,
cartoons, circulars, comic books, financial reports, greeting cards, illustrations, lectures, magazine articles, news stories, nonfiction books, novels, paintings, pamphlets, photographs, plays,
posters, sermons, speeches. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 576-736
(1978) (discussing free speech values and specific rights of communication and expression).
See also Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981) (live nude dancing entitled to
first amendment protection).
202. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
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regulatory schemes that completely prevent speech activities, but
also to regulations and statutes that impose burdens and conditions
that could stifle or chill the exercise of free speech. 0 3 Not all speech
or other communicative activities are accorded first amendment protection, however. Obscenity, for example, is one form of speech that
is outside the protection of the first amendment, and thus subject to
regulation and restraint.204 Historically, restraints on obscenity have
included criminal 0 5 and civil 06 searches and seizures and licensing
20 7
requirements.
Suppression of obscenity involves regulation at the borderline
between unconditionally protected speech and speech which may legitimately be regulated. If a work is found to be obscene, it is often
subject to total prohibition and suppression; if not obscene, a work is
entitled to full first amendment protection.208 The Supreme Court
has noted that separating protected from unprotected speech requires the use of "sensitive tools." 09 Because obscenity is often separated from constitutionally protected speech by a dim and uncertain
line, "regulations of obscenity [must] scrupulously embody the most
rigorous procedural safeguards" in order to prevent the suppression
210
of protected speech.
Since the character of the speech restrained is central to the
question of its first amendment protection, the Supreme Court has
struck down regulatory or statutory schemes that permitted seizure
of alleged obscene works without any procedure "designed to focus
searchingly on the question of obscenity. '211 This requirement
springs from the Court's fundamental belief, expressed in virtually
all the obscenity-regulation cases, that "only a judicial determination
in an adversary proceeding ensures the necessary sensitivity to free'21 2
dom of expression.
In Marcus v. Search Warrant,213 the Court struck down a state
statute that permitted search for and seizure of allegedly obscene
203. See Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975).
204. See Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 65 (1963).

205. See Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
206. See Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975).

207. See Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Monaghan, First Amendment "Due Process," 83 HARV. L. RaV. 518 (1970).
Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 66 (1963).
Id.
Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 732 (1961).
Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965).
367 U.S. 717 (1961).
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publications in a noncriminal proceeding. Under the applicable statute, a warrant authorizing the seizure could be issued upon either
the complainant's "positive" statement that the materials were obscene or upon the complainant's allegation of evidential facts from
which a judicial officer could find probable cause that the works
were obscene. 214 The alleged obscene works were not submitted to a
judicial officer for evaluation before the search warrant was issued.2 15 In A Quantity of Books v. Kansas,218 the Court struck down
a state statute that permitted issuance of a warrant for seizure of
obscene works upon the filing by the state attorney general of a verified information containing only a conclusory assertion that obscene
works were located within the court's jurisdiction.21 7 The Court held
that the procedures in both these cases were constitutionally insufficient because they failed to provide for a preseizure adversary hearing that would prevent the suppression of nonobscene books. 1 ' In a
1973 decision, Heller v. New York,2 1 the Court stated that "[a]ny
large-scale seizure of . . . materials presumptively protected under
the first amendment [will be scrutinized] to be certain that the requirements of Quantity of Books and Marcus are fully met. 2 2 0
C.

PriorRestraints Under the Impoundment Procedures

It is unquestionable that the impoundment procedures under the
214. Id. at 718-19 & n.2.
215. Id. Compare this fact with Rule 2 of the Supreme Court Rules, which required a
plaintiff to submit, with the complaint, copies of the allegedly infringing and infringed works.
This rule was rescinded on February 28, 1966 (effective July 1, 1966). 17 U.S.C.A. foil. § 501
(West 1977).
216. 378 U.S. 205 (1964).
217. Id. at 206-08.
218. Id. at 208, 210-11. In Marcus and Quantity of Books, the Court expanded the
meaning of "prior restraint" to encompass restraints on speech imposed prior to a determination of the speech's character as well as restraints on speech imposed prior to utterance or
publication.
219. 413 U.S. 483 (1973).
220. Id. at 491. Although the Heller Court held that seizure of a single copy of an
alleged obscene work for the purpose of preserving it as evidence may be constitutionally permissible, providing certain safeguards are present, it specifically reaffirmed Marcus and Quantity of Books where mass seizures are made. Id. at 491-93. See also Roaden v. Kentucky, 413
U.S. 496 (1973). In Heller and Roaden, which were handed down on the same day, the Court
stated that a seizure of even one copy of an alleged obscene work may effectively act as a
restraint or suppression of speech. In Roaden one copy of an alleged obscene movie was seized
incident to an arrest by a sheriff acting without a warrant. After invalidating the seizure, the
Court stated that "[s]eizing a film then being exhibited to the general public presents essentially the same restraint on expression as the seizure of all the books in a bookstore." 413 U.S.
at 504.
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copyright act, like the statutory schemes regulating obscenity described above, constitute a suppression of speech when works with
first amendment values are seized. The impoundment procedures allow mass seizures of such works prior to any judicial determination
reached after an adversary hearing on the question of infringement.22 ' Indeed, the plaintiff is not required by the impoundment
procedures to make any specific factual showing of infringement
other than that in the complaint, or even to submit copies of both
parties' works for comparison by the judicial officer issuing the order
of impoundment. Nothing in the impoundment procedures limits
their effect to nonspeech works and, potentially, impoundment may
be ordered of works with the highest levels of speech value.
As the Supreme Court recognized in Quantity of Books, a mass
seizure of offending works is "the most effective restraint [of speech]
' Impoundpossible" and is "more repressive than an injunction."222
ments under the copyright act that have been ordered ex parte and
prior to a judicial determination of infringement have involved such
first amendment protected works as motion pictures, 223 sound recordings,224 radio advertising materials, 25 and brochures and booklets.228
The copyright impoundment procedures are similar to those for
regulating obscenity in another important respect. In both situations,
the procedures must distinguish between a prohibited activity and an
activity that is not only innocent but which is encouraged by the first
amendment as a public good, i.e., the exercise of free speech and
expression. In order to prevent the suppression of protected speech,
the impoundment provisions should at least embody the same rigorous procedural safeguards required by the Court in the obscenity
cases. To provide full first amendment protection, however, the im221. See 17 U.S.C.A. foil. § 501, Rules 3, 5 (West 1977).
222. 378 U.S. 205, 210-11.
223. Warner Bros., Inc. v. Kalish, 201 U.S.P.Q. 768 (W.D.N.Y. 1978); Universal Pictures Co. v. Schaeffer, 140 U.S.P.Q. 17 (E.D. Pa. 1963); Universal Film Mfg. Co. v. Copperman, 206 F. 69 (S.D.N.Y. 1913), affd, 218 F. 577 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 235 U.S. 704
(1914); Crown Feature Film Co. v. Bettis Amusement Co., 206 F. 362 (N.D. Ohio 1913).
224. Duchess Music Corp. v. Stern, 458 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 847
(1972); Elektra Records v. Gem Elec. Distrib., Inc., 360 F. Supp. 821 (E.D.N.Y. 1973);
Jondora Music Publishing Co. v. Melody Recordings, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 572 (D.N.J. 1972).
225. Dealer Advertising Dev., Inc. v. Barbara Allan Fin. Advertising, Inc., 197 U.S.P.Q.
611 (W.D. Mich. 1977).
226. Martin Luther King, Jr. Center for Social Change, Inc. v. American Heritage
Prods., Inc., 508 F. Supp. 854 (N.D. Ga. 1981), modified and rev'd on other grounds, 694
F.2d 674 (1 1th Cir. 1983) (court ordered impoundment of advertising brochures and booklets
containing excerpts of speeches by Martin Luther King, Jr.).
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poundment procedures should erect safeguards greater than those required in the obscenity-regulation cases because the substantive law
governing impoundment permits seizures that are often broader and,
consequently, more repressive and chilling of free speech. A writ of
seizure in a copyright action may be used to seize not only the offending copies, but also the instrumentalities and other means for
making such copies, even if the instrumentalities and other means
are capable of noninfringing uses.2 27 In addition, the 1976 Act extends impoundment to alleged infringing copies in the possession of
third parties, even if the copies were reproduced or acquired lawfully. 228 It is the intent of such comprehensive seizures to completely
halt the defendant's allegedly infringing speech activities 229 and, in
the case of alleged piracy, to halt all speech or business activity by
20
the defendant. 3
Given the lack of procedural safeguards accompanying issuance
of a writ of seizure, the threat of impoundment has an extreme chilling effect in actuality. Copyright owners, particularly those represented by associations maintaining large antipiracy departments with
investigators in the field, may pressure alleged infringers and their
distributors by threatening court-ordered impoundment of the alleged infringing works. Short of arresting the alleged infringer, it is
227. See supra text accompanying notes 29-45. Cf. Porno, Inc. v. Municipal Court, 33
Cal. App. 3d 122, 108 Cal. Rptr. 797 (1973). The court held that seizure of movie projectors
used to exhibit obscene movies pursuant to a search warrant violated the first and fourth
amendments. Id. at 126, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 800. The court stated that since movie projectors
were designed for and capable of lawful use, they could not be seized as contraband. Id. Further, since the projectors could be lawfully used as a "means of expression protected by the
First Amendment," the court found that Marcus v. Search Warrant imposed an obligation on
the magistrate to limit search warrants in such a way as not to restrain legitimate expression.

Id.
228. See supra text accompanying notes 46-52.
229. Martin Luther King, Jr. Center for Social Change, Inc. v. American Heritage
Prods., Inc. 508 F. Supp. 854 (N.D. Ga. 1981), modified and rev'd on other grounds, 694
F.2d 674 (11th Cir. 1983); Warner Bros., Inc. v. Kalish, 201 U.S.P.Q. 768 (W.D.N.Y. 1978);
Dealer Advertising Dev., Inc. v. Barbara Allan Fin. Advertising, Inc., 197 U.S.P.Q. 611(W.D.
Mich. 1977); Elektra Records Co. v. Gem Elec. Distrib., Inc., 360 F. Supp. 821 (E.D.N.Y.
1973).
230. See, e.g., Duchess Music Corp. v. Stern, 458 F.2d 1305, 1309 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 847 (1972) ("Congress intended to impound and destroy the whole of the
paraphernalia, including those items which may be used for other purposes."); Elektra Records
Co. v. Gem Elec. Distrib., Inc., 360 F. Supp. 821 (E.D.N.Y. 1973); Jondora Music Publishing
Co. v. Melody Recordings, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 572 (D.N.J. 1972). It should not make any
difference, for the purpose of applying the first amendment, whether the suppression is made
by the government to protect public morals or by a private party, with the aid of a United
States marshal, to protect his or her copyright.
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difficult to imagine a statutory scheme with a more chilling effect on
the exercise of free speech than that permitted by impoundment
under the copyright act.
First amendment challenges to impoundment of alleged infringing works have been dismissed on the grounds that no right of expression is restrained or suppressed by the seizure because an infringer is not expressing himself, but is copying another's
expression. Si A work need not be an identical copy of another's
copyrighted work, however, to be an infringement, and it may be
that the infringer has incorporated significant and original expression
of his own into the infringing work. The plaintiff's claim of infringement may be based on the defendant's copying of material in the
plaintiff's work that is uncopyrightable or in the public domain. Furthermore, the "infringer" may be privileged to appropriate another's
expression within the meaning of the copyright act, in order to exercise his or her right to expression within the meaning of the first
amendment.232 Finally, even if the alleged infringer is making identical copies of the plaintiff's copyrighted work, it is no answer to say
that the first amendment does not protect infringers if, at the time of
impoundment, the defendant's work has not yet been judicially determined to be an infringement.
V.

PROPOSED PROCEDURES

The procedures governing impoundment under the copyright act
231. Dealer Advertising Dev., Inc. v. Barbara Allan Fin. Advertising, Inc., 197 U.S.P.Q.
611 (W.D. Mich. 1977) (first amendment does not protect misappropriators). In Jondora Music Publishing Co. v. Melody Recordings, Inc., 362 F. Supp. 494 (D.N.J. 1973), the court held
that no restraint of speech had occurred because the defendants admitted they copied the
plaintiff's works. See also United States v. LaMonte, 455 F. Supp. 952 (W.D. Okla. 1974)
(dismissal of first amendment challenges to seizures made in criminal copyright infringement
actions).
232. In Rosemont Enter., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 311-13 (2d Cir.
1966) (Lumbard, C.J., concurring), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967), the Second Circuit
denied the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction, noting that the copyright was being
used to suppress the free circulation of ideas and information. See also Time, Inc. v. Bernard
Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (defendant privileged to make a fair use of
virtually all of copyrighted film of the John F. Kennedy assassination). There is no reason why
these first amendment considerations should be limited under the copyright act only to
injunction.
Besides the first amendment/fair use defense to copying, a defendant may have many
other defenses that would negate an apparent infringing use of the plaintiff's copyrighted work.
For example, the defendant's copying may be of elements of the plaintiff's work that are not
protected by copyright (such as ideas, facts, or other material in the public domain), or the
defendant may be licensed to make such a use.
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will require substantial changes before the constitutional infirmities
are cured. In addition to these infirmities, re-evaluation of the impoundment procedures is required by the underlying policies of the
copyright act itself. The act represents a compromise between competing social policies.2 33 One favors the widest possible dissemination
of new ideas and new forms of expression. This policy is derived
from both the first amendment and from the copyright act's own
constitutional directive "[t]o promote the [p]rogress of [s]cience and
useful [a]rts."' 234 The other policy of copyright law is to give authors
and artists enough of a monopoly over their works to ensure their
receipt of fair material rewards for their efforts and to thereby encourage creation of such works.235 The first policy predominates,
therefore the system of rewards should be no more extensive than is
necessary to elicit, in the long run, an optimal amount of creative
activity. 236 As the Supreme Court has stated, the "private motivation
must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public availability of literature, music, and the other arts. ' 237 It follows that the
remedies available to copyright owners to enforce their limited copyright monopolies should be no more drastic than is necessary to obtain their fair material rewards. Clearly, the present impoundment
procedures often work to prohibit the broad public availability of
creative works and overprotect the author's copyright monopoly at
the expense of the public interest.
The fundamental question regarding a proposed procedure is
whether it minimizes the risk of wrongful seizures that would violate
the defendant's constitutional rights. The stringency of the procedural safeguards should increase with the gravity of the rights that
may be violated. Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
with the adaptations discussed below, should be used to cure the constitutional infirmities of the present impoundment procedures, and
would better effectuate the policies underlying the copyright act.
233. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 774, 782-83 (1984);
25,704 (S.D.N.Y.
RCA Records v. All-Fast Systems, Inc., COPYRIGHT L. DEcs. (CCH)
Sept. 7, 1984); Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 445 F. Supp.
875, 882 (S.D. Fla. 1978).
234. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8, quoted in H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
47 reprinted in 1476 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5659, 5660.
235. Id.
236. United States v. Bily, 406 F. Supp. 726, 730 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
237. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 774, 783 (1984).
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Application of the Fifth and Fourth Amendments to the
Impoundment Procedures

In Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., the Supreme Court held that
the fifth amendment required certain procedural safeguards before a
prejudgment seizure of property could be ordered ex parte.2 38 The
procedures in Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governing the issuance of temporary restraining orders, if applied to impoundment, satisfy the procedural due process requirements of
Mitchell. Under Rule 65, temporary restraining orders prior to judgment are issued under judicial supervision and provide for damages
23 9
for wrongful restraint.
Unlike the impoundment procedures, Rule 65 also requires that
the factual showing in support of the application be made by one
with personal knowledge, alleging specific facts demonstrating a reasonable probability of success on the merits in the underlying action.2 40 In addition, Rule 65(b) provides for a prompt, postseizure
hearing:
On 2 days' notice to the party who obtained the temporary restraining order without notice or on such shorter notice to that
party as the court may prescribe, the adverse party may appear
and move its dissolution or modification and in that event the court
shall proceed to hear and determine such motion as expeditiously
as the ends of justice require.2"1
Impoundment procedures currently place the burden on the defendant to prove at the postseizure hearing that the works seized were
not infringements.2 42 Rule 65(b) provides that where the temporary
restraining order is granted without notice,
the motion for a preliminary injunction shall be set down for hearing at the earliest possible time and takes precedence of all matters
except older matters of the same character; and when the motion
comes on for hearing the party who obtained the temporary restraining order shall proceed with the applicationfor a preliminary injunction, and, if he does not do so the court shall dissolve
238. See supra text accompanying notes 134-43.
239. FED. R. Civ. P. 65(c).
240. 11 WRIGHT & MILLER. FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2949 (1973). See
supra text accompanying note 149 for the factual showing required by the impoundment
procedures.
241. FED. R. Civ. P. 65(b).
242. See supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text.
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the temporary restraining order.243
The evidentiary showing and the form of the hearing required for a
preliminary injunction are sufficient to satisfy the Mitchell Court's
requirement that the plaintiff prove, at the postseizure hearing, the
grounds upon which the writ of seizure was issued.
Finally, and most importantly, the procedures governing temporary restraining orders limit their issuance to extraordinary situations. Rule 65(b) states:
A temporary restraining order may be granted without written or
oral notice to the adverse party or his attorney only if (1) it clearly
appears from specific facts shown by affidavit or by the verified
complaint that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage
will result to the applicant before the adverse party or his attorney
can be heard in opposition, and (2) the applicant's attorney certifies to the court in writing the efforts, if any, which have been
made to give the notice and the
reasons supporting his claim that
24'
required.
be
not
should
notice
Ex parte orders of impoundment should also be limited only to
extraordinary situations requiring such a drastic remedy. At present,
impoundment may be ordered for any reason simply upon a plaintiff's request. 45 Such a procedure does not balance the parties' interests in the works; it provides far too much protection of the plaintiff's
interest and maximizes, rather than minimizes, the risk of unfair or
mistaken deprivations. 246 The creditor's interest in Mitchell was a
solely pecuniary interest, and seizure of the goods was made to secure payment of any judgment the creditor might have obtained
against the debtor.24 A plaintiff's interest in a copyrighted work is
more complex. The plaintiff will, of course, have a pecuniary interest
in the alleged infringing copies already sold, the profits from which
may be awarded to the plaintiff after trial on the merits, but the
plaintiff does not have a pecuniary interest in the alleged infringing
copies, instrumentalities, and other means seized from a defendant
under a writ of seizure. They will be destroyed if infringement is
found, or returned to the defendant if it is not.248 The plaintiff's real
interest in applying for a writ of seizure is to halt the sales of the
243. FED. R. Civ. P. 65(b).

244. Id.
245. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.

246. See supra text accompanying notes 124-32.
247. 416 U.S. 600, 604 (1974).
248. 17 U.S.C. § 503(b) (1982).
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alleged infringing works, pending trial on the merits, in order to
minimize any further damage to the copyright. 249 Since the parties
in a copyright action are often competitors, a defendant's infringement could irreparably damage the plaintiff's competitive position in
the marketplace.
The defendant's interest, on the other hand, is to freely engage
in commerce with as little burdening or disruption of its activities as
possible. Enjoining the defendant from engaging in certain activities
is far less burdensome than seizure of all the copies and instrumentalities by which the defendant has engaged in those activities. Thus,
impoundment should be ordered ex parte only when it appears that a
temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction are not sufficient to protect the plaintiff's interest.250 Such a situation arises, for
example, when the defendant violates a temporary restraining order
or preliminary injunction that has already been issued and continues
to sell or tries to conceal or otherwise escape with the alleged infringing works. Another situation where injunction may not be sufficient to protect the plaintiff's interest is where the defendant's work
is a close or identical copy of all or substantially all of the plaintiff's
work, or where it otherwise appears from specific facts that the defendant is primarily engaged in illegitimate and infringing activities.
The plaintiff's interest is far more likely to be defeated in such circumstances than if the alleged infringing works are made or distributed by a defendant otherwise engaged in lawful business activities.
The procedures of Rule 65(b), if applied to impoundment,
would require that the plaintiff allege specific facts from which it
appears that "irreparable injury" will occur if impoundment is not
ordered.2 51 The term "irreparable injury," when applied to impoundment, must be construed by the courts to extend only to the extraordinary situation discussed above; this would require a far narrower construction of the term than is applied to an injunction.5 2
249.

For example, the plaintiff's reputation could be endangered by continued sales if

the alleged infringing works are inferior copies.

250.

See, e.g., Wallace Berrie & Co. v. Custom Styled Toys, Inc.,

COPYRIGHT

L. DEcs.

(CCH) 1 25,492 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 1982).
251. FED. R. Civ. P. 65(b).

252.

A showing of "irreparable injury" for the purposes of obtaining a temporary re-

straining order or preliminary injunction in a copyright action is much less burdensome than

such a showing should be for impoundment. In the former instances, irreparable injury may be
presumed without a detailed showing if the plaintiff demonstrates probable success on the

merits or makes out a prima facie case of infringement. Atari v. North Am. Philips Consumer
Elec. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 620 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982); Wainwright Sec.,
Inc. v. Wall St. Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91, 94 (2d Cir. 1977).
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The further requirements of Rule 65(b), that every temporary restraining order granted without notice "shall define the injury and
state why it is irreparable and why the order was granted without
notice," 253 will help to protect against unwarranted seizures when
these procedures are applied to impoundment. An order of impoundment issued with notice to the adverse party and with an opportunity
for that party to be heard should be issued according to the preliminary injunction procedures of Rule 65, if the works seized are without first amendment value. Such orders of impoundment should not
be held to the stricter requirements of Rule 65(b) that are appropriate when impoundment is ordered ex parte.
The showing of a probability of success on the merits, as required by Rule 65, will also provide probable cause to believe that
infringement of a copyright has occurred, as required by the fourth
amendment. The fourth amendment further requires that the copyright plaintiff demonstrate probable cause that the items to be seized
are related to the infringement and that they will be found in the
places to be searched.254 If the plaintiff makes the requisite showing
of probable cause, as well as the showing required by the fifth
amendment, 255 then seizure may be made of all alleged infringing
copies, instrumentalities, and other means for making them, subject
to the limitations imposed by the first amendment.
The procedures of Rule 65 should also be adapted to cure the
lack of particularity presently permitted in writs of seizure as to the
things seized,256 the places searched,257 and the persons subject to
the impoundment order 58 Rule 65(d) provides:
[E]very order granting an injunction and every restraining order
• ..shall be specific in terms; shall describe in reasonable detail,
and not by reference to the complaint or other document, the act or
acts sought to be restrained; and is binding only upon the parties to
the action, their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys,
and upon those persons in active concert or participation with them
who receive actual notice of the order by personal service or
253. FED. R. Civ. P. 65(b).
254. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 556 (1978).
255. See supra notes 240-43 and accompanying text.
256, See supra notes 178-81 and accompanying text. If the fourth amendment is complied with, a writ of seizure may be used to seize commercial documentation, advertising
materials and other evidence of infringing activities.
257. Id.
258. See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
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otherwise.259
In the context of impoundment, the phrase "act or acts sought to be
restrained" would mean "the places to be searched and the things to
be seized."
By applying Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to
impoundment procedures, the constitutional infirmities presently existing can be corrected and the policies of the copyright act more
completely fulfilled.
B.

First Amendment Due Process and the Impoundment
Procedures

The Supreme Court has held that procedures designed to focus
searchingly on the question of infringement must be followed before
a large-scale seizure is made of works with first amendment value. 60
A preseizure adversary hearing is the only constitutionally sufficient
procedure.261 Therefore, when an application for an ex parte order of
impoundment is made, the court must assess, either by viewing a
copy of the defendant's alleged infringing work or on the basis of
other evidence, whether the work has significant speech value, and
grant or deny the ex parte application accordingly.
One course of action that would satisfy all the constitutional
objections to impoundment is suggested by the Supreme Court's decision in Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown.26 2 Decided in 1957, this case
and the obscenity regulation procedures it approved were specifically
affirmed by the Court in both Marcus and Quantity of Books.2 63 In
Kingsley, a New York civil statute empowered the chief executive or
legal officer of a municipality to seek an injunction against any person or business selling or distributing matter deemed to be "obscene."264 The injunctive proceeding was initiated by a complaint
specifically naming and annexing a copy of the work to be seized. 26 5
The statute provided that the person or business enjoined was entitled to a trial on the merits within one day after joinder of issue and
259. FED. R. Civ. P. 65(d).
260. A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205 (1964); Marcus v. Search Warrant,
367 U.S. 717 (1961).
261. A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205, 210 (1964). See also Zurcher v.
Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 566-67 (1978).
262. 354 U.S. 436 (1957).
263. 378 U.S. 205, 212-13; 367 U.S. 717, 734-38.
264. 354 U.S. 436, 437 (1957).
265. Id. at 438-39.
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that the court was required to render a decision within two days of
the conclusion of the trial. 26 6 If final judgment was entered that the
work was obscene, the statute provided that the sheriff could then
seize and destroy the obscene works. 67 The Kingsley procedures did
not permit any seizure before the character of the speech had been
268
judicially determined.
The Supreme Court held that the statutory scheme in Kingsley
contained safeguards that made it valid, even though it imposed a
prior restraint by injunction.269 First, the restraint imposed prior to
judicial characterization of the speech was imposed for a brief period
of time, the length of which varied according to the time it took the
defendant to answer. 270 The purpose of the injunction, which was
less intrusive and repressive than a mass seizure, was not to suppress
speech or put the defendant out of business, but simply to freeze the
parties' positions until a prompt trial on the merits could be had.27 1
Second, a prompt final judicial determination of the protected or unprotected character of the speech was assured by the statute. 72
Third, the burden of proving that the restrained work was unprotected by the first amendment rested on the party requesting the restraint of speech.27 3
There are three extraordinary situations where ex parte impoundment of works with first amendment values should be permitted. Although a preseizure adversary hearing may be dispensed with
in these cases, there must still be a proceeding prior to seizure that
focuses searchingly on the question of infringement. The same rigorous showing of probable success on the merits required by the fifth
amendment should also be made at this time.
The first instance where ex parte impoundment should be permitted is when the plaintiff shows that the defendant's work is an
identical copy of all or substantially all of the plaintiff's copyrighted
work and that the defendant has no right to copy the plaintiff's work.
In such cases of piracy it is reasonable to presume, at least initially,
that the defendant's work has little or no speech value since it copies
266. Id. at 439.
267. Id. at 438, n.l.
268. Id. at 437.
269. Id. at 437 & n.l.
270. Id. at 437, n.1, 438-39.
271. Id. at 442-44.
272. Id. at 439.
273. Id. at 437 n.l. See also Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965) (extending
rule to licensing scheme regulating obscenity).
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the plaintiff's work. 274 Second, an ex parte order of impoundment
should be issued if it appears that the defendant is not obeying a
temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction that has already been issued. The government, in a copyright infringement action, has a valid interest in enabling its courts to provide effective
final relief. This interest should be allowed to override the potential
threat to first amendment rights in these circumstances. 2 76 Third, an
order of impoundment should be issued prior to notice to the adverse
party if it is designed to seize only one alleged infringing work, in
order to preserve it as evidence, but only in circumstances where
such a seizure will not have the effect of a prior restraint.276 In each
of these three instances a scrupulous adherence to the probable cause
and particularity requirements of the fourth amendment must also
be assured. 7
The procedures of Rule 65 may be adapted for use in any of the
situations outlined above involving impoundment of works with first
amendment value. Other than the length of the time limits on the
procedural safeguards, the major difference between the safeguards
required by the fifth and fourth amendments and those required by
the first amendment is in the finality of the court's determination on
the question of infringement.278 In the former, a proceeding similar
to one for issuance of a preliminary injunction will suffice, while in
the latter, a final decision on the merits is required. 9
If an ex parte order of impoundment is sought in an extraordinary situation, Rule 65(b) prescribes procedural safeguards that adequately protect against violations of first amendment interests.
Under Rule 65(b), a restraint is imposed for a specified brief period
of time; the defendant may move for dissolution or modification of
the temporary restraining order within two days' time or less, or the
temporary restraining order expires, by its own terms, within ten
274. See Dealer Advertising Dev., Inc. v. Barbara Allan Fin. Advertising, Inc., 197
U.S.P.Q. 611 (W.D. Mich. 1977) (first amendment does not protect copied works); Jondora
Music Publishing Co. v. Melody Recordings, Inc., 362 F. Supp. 494 (D.N.J. 1973) (no restraint of speech where defendants admitted copying plaintiff's works).

275.

A prior restraint is not permissible if it alters the status quo. Southeastern Promo-

tions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 562 (1975) (delay in licensing plaintiff's play for produc-

tion altered the status quo by forcing plaintiff to forgo engagement dates and chilling later use
of the forum).
276. See supra note 220.
277. See supra notes 170-81 and accompanying text.
278. Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., 445 U.S. 308 (1980).
279. Id.
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days. 2 0 Further, if an ex parte temporary order is granted, the mo-

tion for a preliminary injunction is set down for hearing at the earliest possible time and takes precedence over all matters except older
matters of the same character. 81
The procedures following ex parte orders of impoundment, however, must be more stringent than those required by the fourth and
fifth amendments. Following such an impoundment, there must be a
prompt, final judicial determination after a proceeding that focuses
searchingly on the question of infringement. The Supreme Court has
held that a preliminary injunction hearing by itself is not a final judicial determination sufficient to impose a restraint on protected
speech.28 2 Rule 65(a)(2), however, permits a preliminary injunction
280. The length of a restraint prior to judicial determination of the character of the
speech may vary according to the context of the seizure. See, e.g., United States v. ThirtySeven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363 (1971) (periods of no more than fourteen days from a customs seizure of alleged obscene works to the institution of judicial proceedings for their forfeiture, and no longer than sixty days from the filing of the action to a final judicial determination, were held to be constitutionally permissible).
281. FED. R. Civ. P. 65(b). The Supreme Court has held that any procedures that restrain or suppress speech protected by the first amendment must "assure a prompt final judicial decision" on the character of the speech and the merits of the underlying action. Freedman'v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 59 (1965); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S.
546, 561-62 (1975); Teitel Film Corp. v. Cusack, 390 U.S. 139, 142 (1968). Indeed, the Court
has stated that a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction, no matter how quickly
it is heard by the issuing court, cannot be considered a final determination on the merits because its validity is based only on a showing of probable success on the merits. Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., 445 U.S. 308, 312, 312 n.5 (1980). The Court has required that any
regulatory or statutory scheme allowing mass seizure of works protected by the first amendment prescribe "explicit time limits" within which such a final judicial determination must be
made, United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 368 (1971).
The post-seizure hearing required by the fifth amendment, on the other hand, does not
need to be a final judicial determination on the merits. The Court stated in Mitchell:
[T]here is scant support in our cases for the proposition that there must be final
judicial determination of the seller's entitlement before the buyer may be even temporarily deprived of possession of the purchased goods. On the contrary, it seems
apparent that the seller . . . would need to establish . . . only the probability that
his case will succeed to warrant the bonded sequestration of the property pending
outcome of the suit.
416 U.S. at 609.
Nor is a postseizure hearing on a search warrant required to be a final judicial determination under the fourth amendment on the merits of the government's case. The Supreme Court
has stated that such a hearing on a warrant should only extend to the truthfulness of the
factual statements made in affidavits supporting the warrant. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S.
154, 170 (1978).
282. Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., 445 U.S. 308 (1980); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975). Injunctions of first amendment activities must be
treated more expeditiously than other civil injunctions and must specifically provide for a swift,
final judicial determination. Vance, 445 U.S. at 309. Conrad, 420 U.S. at 560-62.
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hearing to be consolidated with a trial on the merits, 28 3 a proceeding
that is sufficient to make a final judicial determination on the character of the speech. Rule 65(b) provides that the court shall determine such preliminary injunction motions as "expeditiously" as possible where a temporary restraining order has been granted ex
parte. 2 4 Rule 65(a)(2) and (b) should be construed, however, to require judicial determination within a specified number of days when
impoundment is ordered ex parte, and should place the burden of
proving that the defendant's work is unprotected by the first amendment on the plaintiff.
Finally, if a preseizure, adversary hearing is required (i.e., there
is no extraordinary situation), the plaintiff must bring on the action
in the manner approved by the Supreme Court in Kingsley by moving for a preliminary injunction hearing consolidated with a trial on
the merits. Only at the conclusion of such a trial may a valid seizure
be made.
CONCLUSION

The bases for constitutional attacks on the impoundment procedures are evident. The procedures are untouched by modern notions
of procedural due process, and the only basis for retaining them in
their present form is their antiquity. Because they permit seizures of
property without providing notice and an opportunity to be heard at
a meaningful time, their constitutionality under the fifth amendment
is in serious doubt. Further, the many ways the procedures can allow
unreasonable searches and seizures may invade the privacy and security interests protected by the fourth amendment. Most seriously,
the impoundment procedures present grave danger to the fundamental right of free speech by allowing virtually unregulated restraints
and suppressions of first amendment protected speech.
In addition to exposing the procedures' constitutional infirmities,
it has been the purpose of this Article to suggest ways of curing
these infirmities. Because the likelihood of Congressional action on
these procedures seems slight at this time, some judicial modification
of the procedures is called for. Although the procedures of Rule 65
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may provide a guide for
modification of the impoundment procedures, courts must carefully
distinguish between the natures of the impoundment and injunction
283.
284.

FED. R. Civ. P. 65(a)(2).
FED. R. Civ. P. 65(b).
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remedies and tailor the modified impoundment procedures to preserve the potency of this much-needed remedy, while avoiding its
unique constitutional dangers.
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